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THE DIVORCE ACT, 1968 AND
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
BASED UPON MATRIMONIAL FAULT
D. MENDES DA COSTA*
This is a jurisidiction where technicalities and refinements are ill-
adapted to the purposes the matrimonial causes law is meant to achieve.
Opinions may properly differ whether or not dissolution of marriage
through the courts should be provided as a means of dealing with the
social problem created by marriages that have broken down through the
commission of matrimonial offences. That question was settled for British
communities, however, for all but disputatious purposes, in 1857. More
than a century later, with divorce established, for good or ill, as a social
mechanism available through the courts, the object to be achieved, and
not merely to be desiderated, is a code of matrimonial causes law that
is both intelligible in content and predictable in operation.1
Under see. 91 (26) of the British North America Act, 18672 exclusive
legislative authority over "Marriage and divorce" is conferred upon the
federal Parliament. Prior to 1968, there had been only limited exercise of
this constitutional power and for many years the divorce laws of Canada
continued without comprehensive review. The result was a patchwork of
laws derived from pre-Confederation, English and federal statutes.
In recent years it became increasingly clear that the state of the laws
relating to divorce in Canada was unsatisfactory. A number of private
members' bills were introduced. This activity culminated in the appointment
of a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons. The
terms of reference of this Committee were wide: "to enquire into and report
upon divorce in Canada and the social and legal problems relating thereto, and
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
1Skitch v. Skitch (1961), 2 F.L.R. 8 (Vic.), at p. 13 per Barry J.
2 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, as amended.
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such matters as may be referred to it by either House".3 Commencing on
June 28th, 1966 the Special Joint Committee held twenty-four open meet-
ings and received more than seventy briefs. The Report of the Committee,
released in June, 1967, contained some twenty-one recommendations. Its
proposals were restated in the form of a draft bill contained in Part V of the
Report. On December 4th, 1967 the Divorce Bill, Bill C-187, was introduced
in Parliament and read for the first time. The Report of the Special Joint
Committee was used as a guide in the preparation of Bill C-187, though
there were differences of substance between this Bill and the draft bill of the
Special Joint Committee. Bill C-187 was assented to on February 1st, 1968
and was proclaimed in force on July 2nd, 1968. 4
I
THE STATUTE AS THE SOLE SOURCE OF DIVORCE LAW
AND JURISDICTION
The purpose of the Divorce Act, 1968, a "radically new statute",5 seems
apparent: to provide a Canada-wide law of divorce, exclusively located in one
statute. This result has been achieved. A Canadian law of divorce now exists
for, of course, the Act of 1968 applies to the whole of Canada. However, while
this Act seems to manifest the clear intention to cover the field in relation to
substantive divorce law, it applies only to divorce and does not purport to
directly relate to any other matrimonial cause. Repeal of all prior divorce laws
was necessary, and this is accomplished by sec. 26. Sec. 25 speaks as to the
position after July 2nd, 1968.
1. Repeal of prior laws
Sec. 26 of the Act of 1968 provides:
26. (1) The Dissolution and Annulment of Marriages Act, the
Divorce Jurisdiction Act, the Divorce Act (Ontario), in so far as it
relates to the dissolution of marriage, and the British Columbia
Divorce Appeals Act are repealed.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) of section 19, all other laws
respecting divorce that were in force in Canada or any province
immediately before the coming into force of this Act are repealed,
but nothing in this Act shall be construed as repealing any such
law to the extent that it constitutes authority for any other matri-
monial cause.
At the first meeting of the Legislative Assembly of the newly formed Province
of Ontario in 1792 it was enacted that the common law of England as at the
3 Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on
Divorce, (1967).
4 102, Canada Gazette (Part 1), 1159.
5 Paskiewich v. Paskiewich (1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 622, 623 (B.C.S.C.).
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15th October, 1792 should be received into Ontario.6 At that date the only
method of divorce possible in England was by Act of Parliament. It was
not until 1857 that judicial divorce was introduced into English law.7
Ontario entered Confederation without any law of divorce and this state of
affairs continued until 1930 when the federal Parliament enacted the Divorce
Act (Ontario), 1930:8
2. The law of England as to the dissolution of marriage
and as to the annulment of marriage, as that law existed on the
15th day of July, 1870, in so far as it can be made to apply
in the Province of Ontario, and in so far as it has not been
repealed, as to the Province, by any Act of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom or by any Act of the Parliament of Canada or
by this Act, and as altered, varied, modified or affected, as to the
Province, by any such Act, is in force in the Province of Ontario.
3. The Supreme Court of Ontario has jurisdiction for all
purposes of this Act.
Accordingly this statute introduced into Ontario, English law as to divorce and
annulment of marriage as that law existed on the 15th July, 1870, and also by
sec. 3 conferred divorce and annulment jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court
of Ontario. The Divorce Act (Ontario), 1930, in so far as it relates to the
dissolution of marriage, is now repealed by sec. 26 (1). While, therefore, the
Act of 1930 remains the source of nullity law and jurisdiction, divorce law and
jurisdiction in Ontario now rests upon the Act of 1968.
Other federal statutes are repealed by sec. 26 (1). Briefly stated, the
Dissolution and Annulment of Marriages Act, 19639 provided a new procedure
for granting parliamentary divorces; the Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 193010 was
the Canadian "deserted wives" statute; and the British Columbia Divorce
Appeals Act, 193711 conferred jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeal of
British Columbia to entertain appeals in divorce and matrimonial causes.
The divorce laws of provinces other than Ontario, whose existence did not so
depend on federal statute, are repealed by the general provision of sec.
26 (2).12
6 See now, Property and Civil Rights Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 310.
7 The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Viet., c. 85.
8 R.S.C., 1952, c. 85. Initially, S.C., 1930, c. 14. See also, the Matrimonial Causes
Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 232, see. 10.
9 S.C., 1963, c. 10. See Kennedy, (1954), 32 CAN. B. REv. 211.
10 R.S.C., 1952, c. 84. Initially, S.C., 1930, c. 15.
11 R.S.C., 1952, c. 21. Initially S.C., 1937, c. 4. Generally Poskitt v. Poskitt [1949]
3 D.L.R. 798 (B.C.C.A.). Also, as to the position before the statute see, Scott v. Scott
(1891), 4 B.C.R. 316; Brown v. Brown (1909), 14 B.C:R. 142; Jamieson v. Tytler
(1935), 50 B.C.R. 263.
12 Delaney v. Delaney (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 303 (B.C.S.C.); Webb. v. Webb
(1968), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 100 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes).
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2. After July 2nd, 1968
Sec. 25 (1) provides:
25. (1) A petition for divorce presented in Canada after the
coming into force of this Act shall be governed and regulated by
this Act, whether or not the material facts or circumstances giving
rise to the petition occurred wholly or partly before the coming into
force of this Act.
Petition for divorce is defined in sec. 2 (g) to mean a petition or motion for
a decree of divorce, either with or without corollary relief by way of an order
under secs. 10 or 11. Sec. 5 provides that, subject to the limitations con-
tained therein,' 3 the "court for any province" has divorce jurisdiction. Sec. 2
(e) defines the meaning of "'court' for any province" and sec 2 (f) defines
the meaning of "'court of appeal' ",14 Pursuant to sec. 22 of the Act, the
Superior Court of Quebec15 and the Supreme Court of Newfoundland 16 have
been proclaimed to be courts for the respective Provinces for the purposes of
the Divorce Act, 1968. The words of sec. 25 (1) make it clear that a petition,
presented after the 2nd July, 1968, may be based on facts or circumstances
which occurred wholly or partly before that date. Thus a petition may be
presented under see. 4(1) (e) on the basis of five or three years separation,
even though the majority of the relevant period occurred prior to the com-
mencement of the Act of 1968.17
For petitions presented after the 2nd July, 1968 there appears no
question but that the Divorce Act, 1968 is the sole repository of substantive
divorce law in Canada. 18 This Act is not merely a consolidation of earlier
statutes. There is in Canada no residual "common law of divorce"; 19 this
follows from the general repealing provisions of sec. 26. That is, subject to
this qualification: the Act makes use of various words, which it does not
l3 Hardy v. Hardy [1969] 2 O.R. 875. But see Wood v. Wood (1968), 2 D.L.R.
(3d) 527 (Man. Q.B.). See too Geldart v. Geldart (1969), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 277
(N.S.S.C.). Generally, Mendes da Costa, Some Comments on the Conflict of Laws Pro-
visions of the Divorce Act, 1968, (1968), 46 CAN. B. REv. 252.
14As to Nova Scotia, see Webb v. Webb (1968), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 100 (N.S. Ct.
for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes).
15 102, Canada Gazette (Part 1), 1159-60.
16 102, Canada Gazette (Part 1), 1612.
17For example, Rushton v. Rushton (1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 25 (B.C.S.C.);
Kennedy v. Kennedy (1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 405 (B.C.S.C.); Kostrakewich v. Kos-
trakewich [1969] 1 O.R. 295.
18 There is already a considerable body of juristic comment on this Statute. See,
inter alia, Special One-Day Programme on the New Divorce Act & Rules, conducted by
the Law Society of Upper Canada; Mendes da Costa, Some Comments, see footnote 13;
Payne, The Divorce Act (Canada), 1968, (1969), 7 ALTA. L. Rav. 1; Sopinka, The
Divorce Act, 1968. Collusion Confined, (1969), 47 CAN. B. REv. 31; Skelly, Refusal of
Sexual Intercourse and Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce, (1969), 7 ALTA. L. REv. 239;
Mendes da Costa, The Canadian Divorce Law of 1968 and its Provisions on Conflicts,
(1969), 17 AM. J. Com'. L. 214; Skelly, Divorce Reform a Reality, (1969), 10 Lvs
CAHI S DE DROIT 85; Green, The Divorce Act of 1968, (1969), 19 U. ov T. L. J. 627;
Hubbard, Domestic Relations: The Divorce Act, 1968, (1968), 3 OTrAwA L. Rav. 172.
19 Contrast the position under the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965. See, Ives
v. Ives [1968] 2 W.L.R. 807, 819.
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define, and which have been the subject of definition under the prior law.
In the construction of the Act of 1968 the courts will, no doubt, on occasions
construe these words by reference to their earlier meaning as so ascertained.
To this extent the prior law will be carried forward. But even so, the only
method of contact with this prior law will be by way of interpretation of the
Divorce Act, 1968. The courts, however, are by no means constrained to reach
back into the earlier law in this way. As has been stated, the statute "must be
read as standing on its own and the Court must resist looking back". 20
3. Transitional provisions
On July 2nd, 1968 there were no doubt proceedings for divorce which
had been instituted in the Canadian courts but had not then been completed.
Sec. 25 (2) controls these pending proceedings and provides:
25.............. .........
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal by section 26 of the Acts
and laws referred to in that section but subject to subsection (3) of
this section,
(a) any proceedings for divorce commenced in any court in
Canada of competent jurisdiction before the coming into
force of this Act and not finally disposed of when this Act
comes into force, shall be dealt with and disposed of in
accordance with the law as it was immediately before the
coming into force of this Act, as though that law had not
been repealed; and
(b) any petition for the dissolution or annulment of a marriage
filed under the Dissolution and Annulment of Marriages
Act before the coming into force of this Act and not finally
disposed of when this Act comes into force, shall be dealt
with and disposed of in accordance with that Act, as though
that Act had not been repealed.
Accordingly, to this extent, the law prior to the Act of 1968 is retained. 21
2 0 Fleming v. Fleming (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 710 (N.W.T.T.C.), at p. 712 per
Morrow J. Also, Davies v. Davies (1969), 3 D.L.R.. (3d) 381, 384 (N.W.T.T.C.). Also
see Re Sheppard (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 458 (N.W.T.T.C.) where at p. 463 Morrow J.
said: "The effect of ss. 25 and 26 of the new Divorce Act is certainly to establish clearly
that this statute governs all divorces to be brought now." See, Bennett v. Bennett (1968),
69 D.L.R. (2d) 341 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes), where, in a petition
heard before the commencement of the Act of 1968, the Court had regard to the
prevailing social and ethical views of the nation as set out in the Divorce Act, 1968, in
determining to exercise its discretion and grant a divorce notwithstanding delay in the
presentation of the petition.
2ILevick v. Levick (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 11 (N.S.S.C. App. Div.). Presumably
an amendment cannot be made to pending proceedings, to include as a ground for
divorce, a circumstance which did not so exist under the law prior to July 2nd, 1968,
but which is now a ground for divorce under the Divorce Act, 1968. For such circum-
stance would constitute, as a new cause of action, a cause of action that did not exist at
the date when the pending proceedings were commenced. Further, such an amendment
would seem not to be a "petition for divorce" within the meaning of see. 25 (1). And
see. 25 (2) requires that pending proceedings "shall be dealt with" under the prior law.
This issue is, of course, of passing interest only.
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Sec. 25 (3) deals with variation or rescission of orders for corollary
relief made under the old law:
25. ............. . ..............
(3) Where a decree of divorce has been granted before the
coming into force of this Act or pursuant to subsection (2), any
order to the effect described in subsection (1) of section 11 may be
varied from time to time or rescinded in accordance with subsection
(2) of that section by the court that would have had jurisdiction
to grant the decree of divorce corollary to which the order was made
if this Act had been in force at the time when the petition for the
decree was presented and that court had made the order by way of
corollary relief in respect of a petition presented to it.
Sec. 25 (3) refers only to orders to the effect described in sec. 11 (1). Its
operation, however, is prospective and in this regard it differs from sec. 25(2).
Thus in proceedings, commenced after July 2nd, 1968, for the variation of
a custody order granted under the old law, sec. 25(3) was held to require the
court to treat this order as if it had been made under the Act of 1968 and to
consider any variation thereof under the provisions of sec. 11(2).22
II
SOME STATISTICAL INFORMATION
On July 2nd, 1969 the Divorce Act, 1968 completed its first year of
operation. Some statistical information relating to the number of petitions
presented, and a breakdown as to grounds for divorce, may be of interest.
1. Number of divorce actions
Table "A" below contains the number of divorce actions commenced
in some Canadian jurisdictions during the years 1966 and 1967 and from
January 1st, 1968 to July 2nd, 1968. Also set out is the number of divorce
petitions presented to the courts of these provinces and territories during the
period July 2nd, 1968 to June 30th, 1969.23
22 Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (1969), (N.S.S.C.), (unreported). Also see Re Sheppard
(1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d.) 458 (N.W.T.T.C.).
23The statistical information contained in Tables "A" and "B" has been obtained
from the Press Release of the Department of Justice, Ottawa. Also from the Registrars
or other administrative officials of the Superior Courts of the Provinces and Territories.
The writer is much obliged to those concerned for their co-operation.
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TABLE "A"
NUMBER OF PETITIONS PRESENTED
Yukon
Manitoba Nova Scotia Ontario P.E.I. Territory
1966 529 517 5176 18 18
1967 539 541 5883 24 17
1968, to July 1 252 262 3173 14 8
July 2, 1968- 1711 874 16495 91 61
June 30, 1969
It will be seen that while in each jurisdiction the number of divorce actions
remained relatively constant during the periods prior to July 2nd, 1968, a
sharp rise occurred thereafter. This increase no doubt reflects the fact that
the Divorce Act, 1968 served a very real social need in so far as it made
divorce possible for spouses who were unable to obtain this relief under the
old law.
2. Breakdown as to grounds for divorce
To administer the jurisdictional provisions of the Divorce Act, 1968,24
a Central Divorce Registry, served by computer, has been established at
Ottawa.25 This central administration has made possible the following table,
Table "B", which contains a breakdown of grounds for divorce in relation
to petitions presented under the Act of 1968 from July 2nd, 1968 to June
30th, 1969. In this table, where a number is listed in respect of a ground
under the letter "M", that ground is one of multiple grounds listed in the
petition. Where a number is listed in respect of a ground under the letter
"S", that ground is the single ground listed in the petition. As a result it will
be noted that the total number of grounds indicated in the table is higher than
the total number of petitions.
24 Mendes da Costa, Some Comments, 274-276, see footnote 13.
25 MacDonald, Divorce Enters the Computer Age, (1968), 11 CAN. B. J. 242.
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Symposium on Family Law
It is clear from these tables that the grounds more frequently invoked
are: sec. 3 (a), adultery; sec 3 (d), physical and mental cruelty; and sec. 4
(1) (e), three years separation. With the exception of Quebec, adultery has
been more prevalent as a single ground for divorce than as a multiple ground:
so too, without exception, has separation for three years. Conversely, physical
and mental cruelty have predominantly been utilized as multiple grounds. It
may be that physical and mental cruelty are frequently relied upon in the
alternative. Possibly other factors are pertinent: for example, there may in
many cases be sufficient, but not conclusive, evidence to support an allegation
of cruelty.
RECONCILIATION
Although the Divorce Act, 1968 increases the grounds available for
divorce, one of its main thrusts is the introduction of provisions, novel to
Canada, aimed at reconciliation.
26
1. Duty of legal adviser
Sec. 7(1) imposes a duty upon every legal adviser. Shortly put, except
where the circumstances of the case are of such a nature that it would clearly
not be appropriate to do so, the duty requires the lawyer to draw to the
attention of his client, those provisions of the Act that have as their object the
effecting where possible of a reconciliation;2 7 to inform his client of the mar-
riage counselling or guidance facilities known to him; and to discuss with his
client the possibility of a reconciliation. By sec. 7(2) every petition for
divorce shall have endorsed thereon a statement of compliance with sec. 7.28
To what extent this provision has been productive in effecting recon-
ciliations cannot be stated with any certainty. The attention of legal advisers
has, however, obviously been directed to the possibility of reconciliation.
Possibly, as a consequence of sec. 7, some kind of working relationship may
emerge between lawyers and those social agencies that are concerned with
marriage counselling and guidance.
26The Australian Act contains reconciliation provisions. See, the Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1959, Part III; also Part 11; see too sec. 5 (1) containing the definition of
"marriage conciliator" and "marriage guidance counsellor". Generally, Toose, Watson and
Benjafield, AusTRALiAN DIVoRcCE LAw AND PRACTICE, (1968), 30-40. So too, to a lesser
extent, does the New Zealand legislation, which followed the Australian lead. See, the
Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1963, sec. 4; also see sec. 15. Generally, Sire, DiVORCE
LAw AND PRACTICE IN NEW ZEALAND, (1965), 7th ed., 16-17. See Payne, Statutory Recon-
ciliation Provisions in Australia and New Zealand, (1968), 11 CAN. B. J. 226.
27 See sees. 2 (d) and 9 (3) (b).
28 Rule 15 of the Australian Matrimonial Causes Rules requires similar activity
from the legal adviser. See, Toose, Watson and Benjafield, op. cit., 721, 916-917.
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2. Duty of the court
Sec. 8 imposes a duty upon the court. This section would seem to
represent society's last endeav6ur to preserve the marriage status.
It operates at the end-point of marital disputes when, no doubt, positions
have been taken and have become more or less polarized. Sec. 8
provides:
8. (1) On a petition for divorce it shall be the duty of the court, before
proceeding to the hearing of the evidence, to direct such inquiries to the
petitioner and, where the respondent is present, to the respondent as the court
deems necessary in order to ascertain whether a possibility exists of their
reconciliation, unless the circumstances of the case are of such a nature
that it would clearly not be appropriate to do so, and if at that or any later
stage in the proceedings it appears to the court from the nature of the case,
the evidence or the attitude of the parties or either of them that there is a
possibility of such a reconciliation, the court shall
(a) adjourn the proceedings to afford the parties an opportunity of becoming
reconciled; and
(b) with the consent of the parties or in the discretion of the court, nominate
(i) a person with experience or training in marriage counselling or
guidance, or
(ii) in special circumstances, some other suitable person,
to endeavour to assist the parties with a view to their possible reconciliation.
(2) Where fourteen days have elapsed from the date of any adjournment
under subsection (1) and either of the parties applies to the court to have
the proceedings resumed, the court shall resume the proceedings.
By sec. 21 (1) a person nominated by a court under the Act to endeavour to
assist the parties to a marriage with a view to their possible reconciliation is
not competent or compellable in any legal proceedings to disclose any admis-
sion or communication made to him in his capacity as the nominee of the
court for that purpose. By sec. 21 (2) evidence of anything said or of any
admission or communication made in the course of an endeavour to assist the
parties to a marriage with a view to their possible reconciliation is not
admissible in any legal proceedings.
In Ontario the practice seems to be for the court itself to direct inquiries
to the spouses; this occurs in open court. Several questions are, however,
raised by sec. 8. This section requires the Court to direct inquiries to the
spouses "before proceeding to the hearing of the evidence". Are the responses
of the parties to the Court's inquiries themselves "evidence"? Should the
inquiries be directed before the oath is administered; or after this has occurred?
One approach has been to administer an oath varied so as to relate only to
evidence touching the inquiries as to whether a possibility exists of reconcili-
ation.29 The philosophy of see. 8 is, of course, to achieve, where possible,
a reconciliation. Absent other considerations, the practice which is designed
to more readily accommodate this purpose would appear preferable. Sec. 8
directs the court to ascertain whether there is a possibility of reconciliation.
The court is to base its determination upon the "nature of the case, the
29 Foley v. Foley (1969), (N.S.S.C.), (unreported); the judgment of which contains
a form of varied oath.
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evidence or the attitude of the parties or either of them." This expression
is very wide and enables the court to have regard to all relevant factors. But
the attitudes of the parties may well differ. What if only one spouse desires
reconciliation? This was the position in Paskiewich v. Paskiewich, where the
Court was satisfied that the respondent-husband desperately wanted a recon-
ciliation. The Court found, however, that there was no possibility of reconcili-
ation. Gregory J. stated: 30
On the evidence I find that there is no possibility of a reconciliation. I am
satisfied on the evidence that the petitioner will not go back and live with her
husband as his wife and I hold that even the most fervent and sincere hope of
one spouse that there will be a reconciliation cannot create "a possibility of a
reconciliation" where the other spouse is unreconcilable.
Paskiewich v. Paskiewich was referred to in Matthews v. Matthews.3' In the
Matthews case the Court did adjourn the proceedings. There had on at least
two earlier occasions been a separation and reconciliation, once after decree
nisi but before decree absolute, and Cowan C.J.T.D. was of the opinion that
in the case before him he should make every effort to give an opportunity to
the parties to become reconciled. The proceedings were not adjourned to a
fixed date, the Court's interpretation of sec. 8 being that they should be
adjourned without day.
Considerations, other than a determination of whether a possibility of
reconciliation exists, appear involved in the application of sec. 8. In Rushton
v. Rushton32 the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia concluded its judgment by
expressing concern about the procedural difficulties inherent in the inquiry
directed by this section. McLellan, Local Judge, said:
As a result of the rather extensive questioning of the petitioner during her two
appearances on the stand and the respondent's one appearance, much of the
matrimonial history of this unfortunate marriage was brought out. While it was
under oath, I question whether it can be properly considered as evidence in the
cause because of the special oath put to the parties. By the form of the oath, the
evidence was limited to inquiries as to whether a possibility existed of a reconcili-
ation between the parties. A more damning indictment of the procedure is the fact
that the conduct of the cause was virtually taken out of the hands of counsel
engaged. It may be that in the majority of cases a few perfunctory questions will
satisfy the requirements of s.8, but in cases such as this, it seems to me that the
court cannot discharge its duty without a searching inquiry. Most petitioners will
simply state that no possibility of reconciliation exists, else why would they be
proceeding with the action? The answer to the problem I have outlined may lie
in the fact that the court ought to accept that statement as final and conclusive,
but such acceptance does not seem to me to be discharging the positive duty laid
on the court by s.8. In cases such as this, counsel may have to lead evidence covering
many of the matters stated on the inquiry so that it becomes evidence in the cause.
Inquiries have been directed to the central administrative officials of the
Superior Courts of all Canadian provinces and territories. From these inquiries
the writer is aware of approximately ten occasions, all in Nova Scotia, upon
30 (1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 622, 624 (B.C.S.C.). See also Fleming v. Fleming (1968),
69 D.L.R. (2d) 710 (N.W.T.T.C.).
31 (1969), (N.S.S.C.), (unreported).
32 (1969), (N.S.S.C.), (unreported).
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which there has been an adjournment pursuant to sec. 8. Local Registrars,
however, have not been contacted and it may therefore be that there have
been other cases which have been so adjourned. While the disposition of the
cases which were adjourned cannot be stated with any certainty, it is believed
that no reconciliations have been effected because of these adjournments.
IV
A MENTION OF SEC. 9: FACTORS WHICH MAY PRECLUDE RELIEF
See. 9, which is here only mentioned, contains factors which may
preclude relief. Some provisions of this section apply to all divorce petitions
while others are more specific in their operation and apply only to petitions
presented under sec. 3, under sec. 4 and under sec. 4 (1) (e).
1. Those provisions which apply to sec. 3.
See. 9 (1) (c) and sec. 9 (2) are concerned with petitions presented
under see. 3. By sec. 9 (1) (c) it is the duty of the court, where a decree is
sought under sec. 3, to satisfy itself that there has been no condonation or
connivance on the part of the petitioner, and to dismiss the petition if the
petitioner has condoned or connived at the act or conduct complained of un-
less, in the opinion of the court, the public interest would be better served by
granting the decree. Accordingly while condonation and connivance are bars
to relief to a petition presented under sec. 3, the qualifying words relating to
the public interest make it clear that they are no longer absolute bars to
relief.33 The term "public interest" is not defined in the Act and will require
interpretation by the courts. In Blunt v. Blunt, where both parties had com-
mitted adultery, Viscount Simon L.C., after referring to four considerations
which guide a court in determining whether to exercise or withhold its dis-
cretion, stated:34
To these four considerations I would add a fifth of a more general character,
which must, indeed, be regarded as of primary importance, namely, the interest of
the community at large, to be judged by maintaining a true balance between respect
for the binding sanctity of marriage and the social considerations which make it
contrary to public policy to insist on the maintenance of a union which has utterly
broken down. It is noteworthy that in recent years this last consideration has
operated to induce the court to exercise a favourable discretion in many instances
where in an earlier time a decree would certainly have been refused.
This fifth proposition of Viscount Simon L.C. was referred to in Bennett V.
Bennett,35 where the issue before the Court was whether to exercise its dis-
33 This is unlike the position in England, Australia and New Zealand. See. 5 of the
English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965; generally, Rayden, PRACncE AND LAw O
DIVORCE, (1967), 10th ed., 263-274, 280-291; Bromley, FAMILY LAw, (1966), 3rd ed.,
126-144. Sec. 39 of the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959, as amended; generally,
Toose, Watson and Benjafield, op. cit., 296-312. Sec. 29 of the New Zealand Matri-
monial Proceedings Act, 1963; generally, Sim, op. cit. 98-100, 106-112; see C. v. C.
[1966] N.Z.L.R. 798; also Mitchell v. Mitchell [1968] N.Z.L.R. 1002.
84 [1943] A.C. 517, 525. See also, Ellis v. Ellis (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 46 (Ont.
C.A.).
35 (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 341 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes).
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cretion and grant a divorce to a petitioner who had waited twenty-five years
before asking for relief. The petition had been presented prior to July 2nd,
1968. The Divorce Act, 1968 was not therefore applicable and as adultery had
been proved it would not have been necessary for the petitioner to rely upon
the ground of permanent breakdown of marriage, had the petition been
presented thereunder. The Court however referred to this statute as an ex-
pression that "the public does not now want the Courts to insist on two
parties remaining married when it is obvious that the marriage has not been
a marriage in practice for years". 36 This reasoning seems correct and would
appear equally applicable to the interpretation of sec. 9 (1) (c). Should this
be so the theory of marriage breakdown would, to this extent, be carried over
to petitions presented under see. 3. Assuming however that a court finds, in
a petition so presented, that there is no possibility of reconciliation and that
there has been a permanent breakdown of marriage, absent other factors, is
the public interest served by a withholding of discretion and a refusal to grant
a divorce?
By sec. 9 (2) any act or conduct that has been condoned is not capable
of being revived so as to constitute a ground for divorce described in sec. 3.37
Condonation is defined in sec. 2 (d) of the Act so as not to include the
continuation or resumption of cohabitation during any single period of not
more than ninety days, where such cohabitation is continued or resumed with
reconciliation as its primary purpose. See. 2 (d) refers to any single period of
not more than ninety days. 8 Does this envisage the continuation or resumption
of cohabitation on more than one occasion, if on each occasion the period of
cohabitation does not exceed ninety days? To construe sec. 2 (d) as so
permitting multiple periods of cohabitation would appear to enhance the
possibility of reconciliation and, if this is so, to thereby further the purpose of
this provision. However this may be, it appears that a period of renewed
cohabitation which comes after reconciliation and which is not entered upon
with a view towards reconciliation is outside sec. 2 (d);39 though in such a
36 Id. at p. 345 per McLellan, Co.CtJ.
37 Compare sec. 42 (3) of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965; "Adultery
which has been condoned shall not be capable of being revived." Generally, Rayden,
287-289, see footnote 33. As to the effect of the continuance or resumption of marital
intercourse, see sec. 42 (1) of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965; France v.
France [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1141; sec. 39A of the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act,
1959, as amended: see. 29 (4) of the New Zealand Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1963.
38Compare see. 9 (3) (b) which contains the expression ".... a single period of
not more than ninety day.. . ." (Italics supplied).
39 Bonin v. Bonin (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 533 (N.S.S.C.). Legislation similar in spirit,
though not identical, to sec. 2 (d) is to be found in the English, Australian and New
Zealand statutes; and Bonin v. Bonin seems an acceptance of the view expressed in the
English cases. The English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965, sec. 42 (2); Brown v. Brown
[1967] P. 105; Herridge v. Herridge [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1506; also, Ives v. Ives [1968] 2
W.L.R. 807; see too sec. 1 (2); France v. France [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1141: see, Irvine,
The Concept of "Reconciliation" and the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1963, (1966), 82
L.Q.R. 525. The Australian Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959, sec. 41A, introduced by
see. 10 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965; see MacDougall, Proposals to Reform
the Law of Condonation, (1966), 39 Ausm L. 295; also, (1966), 39 AusTm. L.
327. The New Zealand Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1963, sec. 29 (5); also see sec. 26.
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case the court may still exercise its discretion under sec. 9 (1) (c) to grant
a divorce.
2. Those provisions which apply to sec. 4.
By sec. 9 (1) (d) it is the duty of the court, where a decree is sought
under sec. 4, to refuse the decree if there is a reasonable expectation that co-
habitation will occur or be resumed within a reasonably foreseeable period.
Under sec. 4 (2) where the existence of any of the circumstances described in
sec. 4 (1) has been established, a permanent breakdown of marriage by
reason of those circumstances shall be deemed to have been established. See.
9 (1) (d) acts as a qualification to this deeming requirement. Sec. 9 (1) (d)
obviously seems inapplicable if the circumstance established is that contained
in sec. 4 (1) (c)-the whereabouts of the respondent-spouse are not known. 40
However a court may find established some other circumstance set out in
sec. 4 (1), and so satisfy sec. 4 (2), and yet may also hold that there is a
reasonable expectation that cohabitation will occur or be resumed; in which
event by see. 9 (1) (d) there is a duty to refuse the decree.
By see. 9 (1) (e) there is a like duty to refuse a decree so sought if
there are children of the marriage and the granting of the decree would pre-
judicially affect the making of reasonable arrangements for their maintenance.
Discharge of this duty may require the court to act of its own volition and, to
ensure a fair and just settlement of the maintenance problem, to make an order
for maintenance even though such relief is not claimed in the petition.41 The
purpose of paragraph (e) seems to be to protect "children of the marriage".
This expression is defined in sec. 2 (b):
2. In this Act,
.,,.........,,,............~....
(b) "children of the marriage" means each child of a husband and wife
who at the material time is
i) under the age of sixteen years, or
(ii) sixteen years of age or over and under their charge but unable,
by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw
himself from their charge or to provide himself with necessaries
of life;
Sec. 2 (b) (ii) refers to "illness, disability or other cause". Does this include
a child who is over sixteen years but who is attending school? Or is the
expression "other cause" to be restricted by the ejusdem generis rule to
causes akin to illness or disability? In Grini v. Grini42 the Court considered
that the particular words in sec. 2 (b) (ii)--"illness, disability"-to be
exhaustive of the whole genus to which they relate and that the general words
40 See. 4 (1) ... ."(c) the petitioner, for a period of not less than three years
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, has had no knowledge of or
information as to the whereabouts of the respondent and, throughout that period, has
been unable to locate the respondent;" See also, Sutt v. Sutt [1969] 1 O.R. 169.
41 Davies v. Davies (1969), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 381 (N.W.T.T.C.). Also see Clark v.
Clark (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 149.
42 (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 640, 645-6, (Man. Q.B.).
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----"or other cause"-should not be construed as restrictive. After a review
of the authorities on the ejusdem generis rule, Wilson J. said:
And so, I reject the notion that I may not consider attendance at
school as a reason whereby a child, issue of the parties to divorce pro-
ceedings, may properly look to a parent for maintenance even though
that child be of the full age of sixteen years. In every case, of course,
the decision to award or deny maintenance must depend on all the cir-
cumstances of the case, no less the ability of the concerned student to
benefit from the education in question than the ability of the parent to
bear the expense of the award demanded.
In the absence of a defence raising change of age, it has been held that the
point of time at which the age of a child is material is the date of the filing of
the petition and not the date of the hearing.48 These decisions are to be
welcomed for, as was cogently stated by Lacourciere J. in Johnston v. John-
ston,43a upon a reading of the Act of 1968 as a whole it is plain "that
Parliament intended that in divorce proceedings the Court should have a
wide power to provide, both during and after the proceedings, for the proper
maintenance, care, custody and upbringing of children whose interests would
be affected by the grant of a decree absolute." The issue before the Ontario
High Court was whether children who had been placed for adoption and
adopted came within sec. 2 (b). The purpose of this provision having been
so established, Lacourciere J. continued:
To say that such power is to be exercised in respect of children who are
no longer in law the children of the spouses in the divorce proceedings,
and the protection of whose interests is the legal obligation of a person
or persons not privy to such proceedings, is, in my view, to ascribe to
Parliament the intention to produce an absurd result.
Accordingly, as the children were not "children of the marriage" within the
meaning of sec. 2 (b), service of the pleadings upon the Official Guardian
pursuant to Rule 796 of the Ontario Rules of Practice was held to be not
necessary.
3. Those provisions which apply to sec. 4 (1) (e).
Sec. 4 (1) (e) contains the "separation ground". With sec. 4 (1) (e)
must be read sec. 9 (3) and sec. 9 (1) (f). Sec. 9 (3) relates to the calcula-
tion of the period of separation, and is not here discussed.44 Relief under sec.
43 Davies v. Davies (1969), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 381 (N.W.T.T.C.).
43a (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 681, 683 (Ont. H.C.).
44 Sec. 9 (3): "For the purposes of paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of section 4,
a period during which a husband and wife have been living separate and apart shall not
be considered to have been interrupted or terminated (a) by reason only that either
spouse has become incapable of forming or having an intention to continue to live so
separate and apart or of continuing to live so separate and apart of his or her own
volition, if it appears to the court that the separation would probably have continued
if such spouse had not become so incapable; or (b) by reason only that there has been
a resumption of cohabitation by the spouses during a single period of not more than
ninety days with reconciliation as its primary purpose."
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4 (1) (e) may, it seems, be obtained against an "innocent" spouse, i.e. a
spouse who has committed no matrimonial offence in the traditional sense.
For this reason sec. 9 (1) (f) imposes a duty upon a court to refuse a decree
sought under sec. 4 (1) (e) if the granting of the decree would be unduly
harsh or unjust to either spouse or would prejudicially affect the making of
such reasonable arrangements for the maintenance of either spouse as are
necessary in the circumstances. Whether a court is obliged to so refuse a
divorce must depend upon a review of all relevant factors. Two criteria are
referred to by sec. 9 (1) (f): that the granting of the decree would be
"unduly harsh or unjust" or would "prejudicially affect" reasonable arrange-
ments for maintenance. The onus of proof appears to be upon the spouse
seeking to invoke sec. 9 (1) (f) -and it seems, sec. 9 (1) (d) and (e).44a
(a) "Unduly harsh or unjust"
The precise meaning of "unduly harsh or unjust" will be determined
by the courts. A similar, though not identical, safeguard to a divorce under the
separation ground was written into sec. 37 (1) of the Australian Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1959. 45 There have been a series of Australian cases dealing with
the meaning of this provision. The difficulty with which a court is faced was
well stated by Walsh J. A. in Macrae v. Macrae:
46
For this reason, I think that there is much force in the view expressed by the Full
Court of South Australia in Painter v. Painter that the "harsh and oppressive"
provision in s. 37 (1) requires that there should be something in the particular case
which goes beyond the normal, and indeed inevitable, consequences of the granting
of a decree under s. 28 (m) or, as their Honours put it, something beyond what is
"in the ordinary run of the mill" in such cases.
This extract was recently referred to by the Ontario High Court in Johnstone
v. Johnstone.47 One argument put forward in the Johnstone case was that a
decree, if granted, would deprive the respondent-wife of her inchoate right to
claim against her husband's estate under the Dependents' Relief Act of
Ontario. This contention did not succeed. The Court, after a review of Aus-
tralian cases, pointed out that whenever a decree absolute is granted, the wife
automatically loses her rights under the Dependents' Relief Act, and that it
would appear that such an inevitable consequence as this could not be the type
of thing Parliament had in mind when drafting sec. 9 (1) (f). Lacourciere I.
stated:
The test of undue harshness or injustice is subjective, and connotes a real and
substantial detriment to the respondent beyond such normal consequences of the
granting of a decree.
44a Johnstone v. Johnstone [1969] 2 O.R. 765, 772.
45 See. 37 (1): "Where, on the hearing of a petition for a decree of dissolution of
marriage on the ground specified in paragraph (m) of section twenty-eight of this Act
(in this section referred to as "the ground of separation"), the court is satisfied that, by
reason of the conduct of the petitioner, whether before or after the separation com-
menced, or for any other reason, it would, in the particular circumstances of the case,
be harsh and oppressive to the respondent, or contrary to the public interest, to grant
a decree on that ground on the petition of the petitioner, the court shall refuse to
make the decree sought."
46 (1967), 9 F.L.R. 441, 465 (N.S.W.). Also, Raggett v. Raggett [1969] V.R. 26.
47 [1969] 2 O:R. 765, 770. Also see Gladman v. Gladman (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d)
350 (B.C.S.C.).
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After stating the dictionary meaning of "harsh" and "unjust", the Court
continued:
As qualified by the word "unduly", these two words mean something to excess and
beyond the due degree of harshness and injustice. The Act therefore impliedly
recognizes that some decrees will inevitably have a certain degree of harshness
or injustice without being unduly harsh or unjust.
While it may not be easy to determine, in any particular circumstance,
whether the granting of a decree would, or would not, be "unduly harsh or
unjust" within the meaning of sec. 9 (1) (f), the correct approach to the
meaning of this phrase finds expression, it is considered, in this decision.
(b) "Prejudicially affect" the making of reasonable maintenance
arrangements
This phrase, which occurs also in sec. 9 (1) (e), does not neces-
sarily require a decree to be refused because of the mere fact that the
petitioner-husband proposes to re-marry.48 As illustrations of the operation of
this provision, two decisions may be mentioned, though the latter, it should
be noted, turned upon the "unduly harsh or unjust" criterion. The protective
provisions of sec. 9 (1) (f) were held not applicable where the case was not
one of a wife who had assisted her husband in building up his estate, or had
acted as his helpmate; though married since 1954 the spouses had lived
together for less than three months, and the petitioner (who had for about
fifteen years made his wife generous payments) in the interim had undertaken
new and heavy responsibilities. 49 On the other hand, where the parties had
been married for thirty-three years and lived together for twenty-six years it
was held, on the facts before the Court, that it would not be right for the
petitioner-husband, for whatever reason, to divorce his wife at this stage in
their lives and to leave her without a substantial asset of any kind as security
for her living accommodation. A decree nisi could result, the Court said, in a
situation which would be unduly unjust to the wife unless a lump-sum payment
was ordered. Divorce would put an end to the wife's rights under the Dower
Act, and the Court, in addition to a monthly payment, ordered the petitioner
to secure against the property which he owned-in which the wife was living
-a lump sum in favour of the respondent-wife to be paid to her when this
property should be sold.50
4. General bars to relief
General bars to relief-that is, provisions which apply to all petitions
whether brought under sec. 3 or under sec. 4-are contained in sec. 9 (1) (a)
and (b). By sec. 9 (1) (a) it is the duty of the court to refuse a decree based
solely upon the consent, admissions or default of the parties or either of them,
and not to grant a decree except after a trial which shall be by a judge,
48 Grini v. Grini (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 640 (Man. Q.B.).
49 Ungarian v. Ungarian (1969), (Man. Q.13.), (unreported). Contrast with sec.
9 (1) (f), sec. 37 of the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959; see. 30 of the
New Zealand Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1963.
50 Ceicko v. Ceicko (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 360 (Man. Q.B.).
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without a jury. The wording of sec. 9 (1) (a) is very wide. Presumably,
however, where spouses have agreed to live separate and apart a decree sought
under sec. 4 (1) (e) would not be based solely upon their consent but would,
rather, be based upon the provisions of that paragraph. The phrase "except
after a trial" has been taken to be "an indication of an exception to what
would otherwise be a bar to the use of admissions", and sec. 9 (1) (a) has
been held not to preclude a judge acting upon admissions presented in the
form of sworn testimony in court.51 On the other hand, a court has felt
precluded from acting upon an admission contained in a respondent's answer,
because to do so would enable spouses to obtain a divorce by consent: 2
Section 9 (1) (a) restricts the use of admissions, particularly those not
under oath. Proof of the commission of the marital offence is necessary by means
other than pleadings or statements outside of the court.
By sec. 9 (1) (b) it is the duty of the court to satisfy itself that there
has been no collusion in relation to the petition and to dismiss the petition if
it finds that there was collusion in presenting or prosecuting it. Collusion,
which is defined in sec. 2 (c), therefore remains an absolute bar to divorce.53
V
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE BASED UPON MATRIMONIAL FAULT
Before commenting upon the grounds for divorce contained in sec. 3 of
the Divorce Act, 1968, it is perhaps desirable to mention, in a general way,
the position as to grounds for divorce in Canada before July 2nd, 1968.
51 Ewasiuk v. Ewasiuk (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 525 (N.W.T.T.C.), at p. 526 per
Morrow J. See too, Foley v. Foley (1968), (N.S.S.C.), (unreported), where the Court
did not have to decide whether it was required to refuse the decree, where the only
evidence was that of the parties or either of them as, in the case then before the Court,
there was other independent evidence, apart from the evidence of the petitioner, in
support of the allegations of the petition. Also see, Monaghan v. Monaghan [1931]
2 D.L.R. 933. See. 9 (1) (a) bears a close resemblance to former Rules 796 and 797 of
the Ontario Rules of Practice. As to former Rule 796 see, Elliott v. Elliott [1933]
O.R. 206.
52 Chouinard v. Chouinard (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 582, 583 per Barry J. Also Bustin
v. Bustin (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 496.
5 3 Sec. 2 (c): "'collusion' means an agreement or conspiracy to which a petitioner
is either directly or indirectly a party for the purpose of subverting the administration
of justice, and includes any agreement, understanding or arrangement to fabricate or
suppress evidence or to deceive the court, but does not include an agreement to the
extent that it provides for separation between the parties, financial support, division of
property interests or the custody, care or upbringing of children of the marriage;"
Generally, Sopinka, op. cit. The words "for the purpose of subverting the administration
of justice" contained in sec. 2 (c) may be contrasted with the expression "with intent to
cause a perversion of justice," which expression occurs in both the Australian and New
Zealand legislation. Collusion is an absolute bar to relief in Australia: see sec. 40 of the
Australian Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959. In England collusion is now a discretionary
bar to relief and a distinction is drawn between objectionable and non-objectionable
collusion; see. 5 of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965; see, Gosling v. Gosling
[1968] P. 1. Also, Bevan, The Scope and Effects of Collusion, (1966), 82 L.Q.R. 371.
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1. Prior to July 2nd, 1968
In Newfoundland54 and Quebec55 the courts did not, before the Divorce
Act, 1968, possess jurisdiction to grant a decree of divorce. For persons
domiciled in these Provinces the only method of obtaining dissolution of mar-
riage was by a private Act of the Federal Parliament, a procedure also
available to persons whose domicile was uncertain. Prior to 1930, this too
was the position in Ontario. By the Divorce Act (Ontario), 1930,56 however,
English law as that law existed on the 15th July, 1870 was introduced into
this Province. In substance, therefore, the divorce law of Ontario rested upon
the terms of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857.57 This English
statute also provided the foundation of the divorce laws of British Columbia,58
Alberta,59 Saskatchewan,60 Manitoba, 6' the Northwest Territories 62 and the
Yukon Territory. 63 By this Imperial Act a husband could obtain a divorce on
the ground of his wife's adultery. For a wife to obtain a divorce, however,
a showing of simple adultery was not enough; she had to prove that her
husband had been guilty of either incestuous adultery, or of bigamy with
adultery, or of rape, or of sodomy or bestiality, or of adultery coupled with
such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa
et thoro, or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for
two years or upwards. 64 A wife was, accordingly, placed in a more disadvan-
tageous position. This so-called "double-standard" was removed in 1925 by
the federal Marriage and Divorce Act,65 and adultery alone was made a ground
for divorce upon the petition of the wife. Adultery, therefore, was a ground
for divorce at the suit of either spouse.66 And rape, sodomy
67 and bestiality65
were grounds available to a wife only. Pre-Confederation statutes were the
source of the divorce laws of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward
54Green v. Green (1963), 49 M.P.R. 315 (Nfl. C.A.).
55 Bilodeau v. Tremblay [1962] Que. S.C. 354.
56 R.S.C., 1952, c. 85. Initially, S.C., 1930, c. 14. See also, the Matrimonial Causes
Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 232, sec. 10.
57 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, sec. 27. Generally, H. v. H. [1936] O.R. 432; Kahl v Kahl
[1943] O.W.N. 558; Coventry v. Coventry [1947] O.R. 141.
58 Smith v. Smith [1952] 2 S.C.R. 312; Sheppard v. Sheppard (1908), 13 B.C.R. 486.
59 Board v. Board [1919] A.C. 956.
60 Fletcher v. Fletcher (1919), 50 D.L.R. 23 (Sask. C.A.).
61 Walker v. Walker [1919] A.C. 947.
62 Board v. Board [1919] A.C. 956.
63 Thornback v. Thornback [1923] 4 D.L.R. 810 (Terr. Ct. of the Y.T.).
6 4 For example, B. v. B. [1919] 3 W.W.R. 894 (Alta. S.C.).
6 5 Marriage and Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 176, sec. 4. Initially, the Divorce
Act, S.C., 1925, c. 41. The Act of 1952 has been repealed in part by sea. 24 of the
Divorce Act, 1968, and is now the Marriage Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 176.
66 This was the position in Ontario; see, however, Upper v. Upper [1933] O.R. 1, 5.
67F. v. F. [1950] 2. W.W.R. 54 (Alta. S.C.); Fast v. Fast [1945] 3 W.W.R. 66
(B.C.S.C.); Warden v. Warden [1951] 3 D.L.R. 336 (Ont. H.C.), between husband and
wife.
68 G. v. G. (1956), 20 W.W.R. 352 (Alta. S.C.).
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Island. In all these Provinces adultery was a ground for divorce and so too
was consanguinity within the degrees prohibited by an early statute.69 Cruelty
and impotence were also grounds for divorce in Nova Scotia; 70 while in New
Brunswick 7' and Prince Edward Island72 the additional grounds were frigidity
or impotence.73
Reference has been made to the repealing provisions of sec. 26 of the
Divorce Act, 1968. The provisions of the Marriage and Divorce Act, so far
as they relate to divorce, are likewise repealed by sec. 24. Accordingly the
grounds for divorce in Canada are now exclusively contained in secs. 3 and 4
of this statute.74 These sections considerably increase the grounds upon which
divorce may be so obtained though each adopts a different philosophy. See. 3
contains those grounds for divorce associated with the traditional doctrine of
matrimonial fault and the concept of matrimonial offence. Sec. 4 blazes a
new trail in so far as it introduces into Canadian law additional grounds for
divorce predicated upon a permanent breakdown of marriage. Further
comment upon sec. 3, but not upon sec. 4, is here proposed.
2. Section 3
Sec. 3 provides:
3. Subject to section 5, a petition for divorce may be presented to a court by
a husband or wife, on the ground that the respondent, since the celebration of
the marriage,
(a) has committed adultery;
(b) has been guilty of sodomy, bestiality or rape, or has engaged in a
homosexual act;
(c) has gone through a form of marriage with another person; or
(d) has treated the petitioner with physical or mental cruelty of such a
kind as to render intolerable the continued cohabitation of the spouses.
These grounds are available to either spouse. They predicate some kind of
wrongful activity committed by the respondent, activity committed since the
celebration of the marriage. The theory of marriage breakdown does not
apply to the offences set out in sec. 3, so that a petitioner is not entitled to
relief simply because there has been a permanent breakdown of marriage.75
69 32 Hen. VIII, c. 38.
70 Generally Clattenburg v. Clattenburg [1955] 2 D.L.R. 272 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce
and Matrimonial Causes). As to cruelty, see White v. White (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d)
60 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes); Countway v. Countway (1968),
70 D.L.R. (2d) 73 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes). Rape was not a
ground for divorce in Nova Scotia; Manuel v. Manuel (1955), 1 D.L.R. (2d) 429 (N.S.
Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes). It may, of course, constitute adultery.
71 Generally, G. v. G. [1943] S.C.R. 527. Bestiality was held not to constitute
adultery, and so was not a ground for divorce in New Brunswick; Babineau v.
Babineau (1924), 51 N.B.R. 501.
72 Generally, Reference on Divorce Jurisdiction, (1952), 29 M.P.R. 120. Williams
v. Williams (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 576 (P.E.I.S.C.).
73 Generally see, Power, Tim LAw AND PRAcxCE RELATO To DIVORCE, (1964),
2nd ed., 1-23, 24-26; REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON DIVORCE, op. cit. 47-62.
74 See. 16 provides that where a decree of divorce has been made absolute under
the Act, either party to the former marriage may marry again.
75 Rushton v. Rushton 1969), (N.S.S.C.), (unreported).
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There is, however, this point. Sec. 31 of the Imperial Matrimonial Causes Act
of 1857, and sec. 5 of the Marriage and Divorce Act, 1952,76 provided that
if the court was satisfied by the evidence that the case had been proved, then,
save as was therein stated, the court "shall pronounce a decree" of divorce.77
This direction to the court was subject to the old absolute and discretionary
bars to relief. The former absolute bars to relief, collusion, condonation and
connivance, are now contained in sec. 9 of the Act of 1968, though condona-
tion and connivance no longer retain their absolute character. The Divorce
Act, 1968 contains however no reference to those factors the existence of
which conferred, under the prior law, a discretion upon the court to grant
or to withhold relief. Sec. 3 merely provides that "a petition for divorce may
be presented". What if sec. 9 is satisfied and if adultery, for example, is
proved; must the court grant a divorce? In Rushton v. Rushton78 the Supreme
Court of Nova Scotia pointed out that there was nothing in the Act of 1968
stating that a court is bound to grant the relief sought on proof of the alleged
ground. McLellan, Local Judge, said:
The mandatory duties of the court under the present act are set out in ss. 8 and 9,
and certain discretionary powers are set forth in ss. 10, 11 and 12 ("Corollary
Relief") and also in s. 13. There is nothing in the act imposing any duty on the
court to make any particular finding or to grant any particular relief. Does the
mere absence from the Divorce Act of a provision similar to s. 5 in the Marriage
and Divorce Act indicate Parliament's intention that the court shall not be bound
to grant the prayer of the petition even if the grounds have been proved?
The Court inclined to the conclusion that it was not bound to grant a decree
on proof of the ground alleged. If this is the result of sec. 3, a statutory lacuna
would appear to arise for, in such circumstances, on what basis should relief
be granted or withheld? No assistance is to be derived from the Divorce Act,
1968, and in the Rushton case it seemed to the Court, on the assumption its
conclusion was correct, that it ought to apply the principles which were being
followed in Nova Scotia just prior to the commencement of this statute.79 In
the result, a decree was granted.
While it is clear that the Divorce Act, 1968 does not expressly state that
a court is bound to grant a decree if the petitioner proves the existence of a
ground for divorce prescribed in sec. 3, it is however considered that this
result is implicit in the statute. The bars to relief-collusion, condonation and
connivance-are set out in sec. 9 and, as was pointed out in Delaney v.
Delaney,80 the Act has ignored and by so doing swept away, what were
formerly the discretionary bars to relief. The general repealing provisions of
sec. 26 of the Act have left a complete void in the field of divorce law in
Canada, a void filled exclusively by the provisions of this legislation. Reference
76 Now repealed.
77 As to the duty imposed upon the court by secs. 29 to 31 of the Imperial Matri-
monial Causes Act of 1857, see MacNeil v. MacNeil (1967), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 171
(N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes).
78 (1969), (N.S.S.C.), (unreported).
79 See, for example, Bennett v. Bennett (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 341 (N.S. Ct. for
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes). Also, Ellis v. Ellis (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 46 (Ont.
C.A.).
80 (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 303 (B.C.S.C.).
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to the old law is now only permissible if such law is preserved by, and if such
a reference is directed by, the Divorce Act, 1968.81 Should sec. 3 be construed
by implication as preserving and directing a reference to the old law as to
discretionary bars to relief as that law existed in each Canadian jurisdiction
prior to July 2nd, 1968? Absent collusion, condonation or connivance, it
appears more consistent with the purpose of the statute, to provide a new
law of divorce for the whole of Canada, to interpret sec. 3 as imposing a
mandatory duty on a court to grant a divorce on proof of the ground alleged.
(a) Adultery
Adultery, a "serious matrimonial offence", 82 is retained as a ground
for divorce by sec. 3 (a). Adultery is not defined in the Act; nor was it
defined in the prior provincial divorce laws. Indeed, the Report of the Special
Joint Committee stated that there was "obviously no need for a statutory
definition ' 8 of this offence. Presumably the old law will be carried over to
the interpretation of sec. 3 (a). While the meaning of adultery may not have
been the same in all countries or under all systems of law, in its essence it has
always been regarded as an "invasion of the marital rights of the husband or
the wife". 84 And it does not matter that the adultery complained of was com-
mitted out of the jurisdiction where the parties were then resident and domi-
ciled.85 In Kahl v. Kahl the High Court of Ontario stated: 86
Adultery has been defined by Orde J., in Orford v. Orford...., as voluntary sexual
intercourse by a married person with another person of the opposite sex, other
than his or her spouse.
(i) Voluntary
As sexual intercourse, to constitute adultery, must be voluntary, or
consensual, consent is a necessary ingredient. In the absence of evidence to
the contrary, consent will be assumed.8 7 When a woman is raped she does
not commit adultery.88 Though the position is not free from doubt, it is
considered that once there is evidence of involuntariness the evidential burden
shifts to the wife to adduce credible evidence of rape; but that the legal onus
of proof that the intercourse was consensual remains at all times upon the
81 See pp. 4-5 ante.
82 Inglis v. Inglis [1967] 2 W.L.R. 488, 494.
83 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND House OF
COMMONS ON DIVORcE, op. cit., 104.
84 Orford v. Orford (1921), 49 O.L.R. 15, 22.
85 Myanduk v. Myanduk [1931] 2 D.L.R. 693 (Alta. S.C.).
86 [1943] O.W.N. 558, at p. 559 per Kelly J. Also see, Babineau v. Babineau (1924),
51 N.B.R. 501, at p. 503: "In all of the authorities, adultery is defined "as the sin of
incontinence between two married persons, or it may be when only one of them is
married,"...." See too Chouinard v. Choulnard (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 582.
87 Cunningham v. Cunningham (1966), 11 F.L.R. 399 (Qld. S.C.).
88 Redpath v. Redpath [1950] 1 All E.R. 600; Barnett v. Barnett [1957] P. 78.
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husband.89 It has been held that a girl of a young age cannot be found guilty
of adultery9O for, the premise seems to be, she cannot at law consent to the
act of sexual intercourse. 91 Merely however because her consent is no defence
for the purpose of certain criminal proceedings does not necessarily mean that
it should likewise be immaterial for the purpose of divorce law. There is,
however, much to be said for the view that to find a girl of twelve years
guilty of adultery would be "highly against public interest". 92 In situations of
this kind, the party acting voluntarily will, of course, commit adultery. Thus
the commission of rape by a husband does constitute adultery on his part. 93
And a claim for damages for criminal conversation may succeed against a
male co-respondent although the divorce proceedings are dismissed for want
of proof of voluntary intercourse on the part of the wife.
94
There is authority for the view that insanity precludes adultery;
95 so too
if the respondent was so drunk9s or under the influence of drugs as to be
incapable of consenting, at least provided that this state of affairs is excusable
in all the circumstances. 97 The House of Lords has, however, recently held that
insanity is not necessarily a defence to a charge of cruelty.98 The impact of
this decision upon the earlier cases involving the reason for consent, or lack
of consent, in the law of adultery cannot be stated with certainty. 99
89 Cunningham v. Cunningham (1966), 11 F.L.R. 399 (Qld. S.C.), at p. 403 per
D. M. Campbell J.: "In Vrska v. Vrska Chamberlain J. said: "The legal onus is on the
plaintiff to establish adultery. It is true enough that if intercourse is proved, and nothing
more, the plaintiff would not be expected to show positively that it was consented to.
That would be assumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. But once there is
evidence which raises the issue of the voluntariness of the relevant act of intercourse the
plaintiff will fail unless he establishes that element of his charge." In my opinion, this
passage from the judgment of Chamberlain J. correctly states the position as to proof of
adultery." Also, Clarkson v. Clarkson (1930), 46 T.L.R. 623. But see, Redpath v. Red-
path [1950] 1 All E.R. 600; Hall v. Hall [1947] 1 W.W.R. 625 (Sask. K.B.). Generally,
Cross, EVIDENCE, (1967), 3rd ed., 73.
90 Barnett v. Barnett [1957] P. 78; Kahl v. Kahl [1943] O.W.N. 558. Also, Stewart
v. Stewart [1943] O.W.N. 255.
91 The Criminal Code, S.C., 1953-54, c. 51, as amended, see. 132.
92 Barnett v. Barnett [1957] P. 78, at pp. 82-83 per Mr. Commissioner Temple
Morris Q.C. Also Kahl v. Kahl [1943] O.W.N. 558, 559. But see, Rayden, op. cit.,
173 n. (b).
9 3 Corkum v. Corkum (1902), 40 N.S.R. 429; Manuel v. Manuel (1955), 1 D.L.R.
(2d) 429 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes). Also, Lauritson v. Lauritson
(1932), 41 O.W.N. 274.
9 4 Vrska v. Vrska [1960] S.A.S.R. 74. At pp. 79-80 Chamberlain J. said: "It would
be an odd result if the co-defendant could escape the legal consequences of his adultery
because it also amounted to rape".
95 This issue is discussed in McLaren v. McLaren (1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 716 (Sask.
Q.B.). But see, Stenhouse v. Stenhouse [1945] 2 D.L.R. 539 (Man. C.A.).
96 Cunningham v. Cunningham (1966), 11 F.L.R. 399 (Qld. S.C.).
97 Generally, Power, op. cit., 48, 416; Rayden, op. cit., 172-175, 301-302; Bromley,
op. cit., 92-93; Tarlo, Intention and Insanity in Divorce Law, (1963), 37 AusTR. L. J.
3, 12-16.
98 Williams v. Williams [1964] A.C. 698.
99 Contrast, Rayden, op. cit., 301-302; Bromley, op. cit., 93.
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(ii) By a married person with another person of the opposite sex
Adultery is committed by a "married person". To constitute adultery
it is necessary that at least one party to the act of intercourse should be
married: but both need not be. Intercourse before marriage is not adultery:
at least if the other party involved was also single. 00 See. 3 provides that a
petition for divorce may be presented on the ground that the respondent,
since the "celebration of the marriage" has committed adultery. Accordingly
if before the marriage of HI and Wl, H1 had engaged in intercourse with W2,
this would be adultery and provide a ground for divorce at the suit of H2.
But not at the suit of Wi, for the adultery was committed before the celebra-
tion of her marriage. Recent cases have raised the question as to whether a
divorced wife can commit adultery. The position seems to be that if after the
divorce the ex-wife engages in intercourse, this will not amount to adultery if
the male party is unmarried;' 0 ' but if the male party is married both are,
apparently, guilty of adultery' 02
Though a wife may perhaps be a participant to the rape of another
woman, 03 such conduct would not constitute adultery, for, inter alia, another
person of the "opposite sex" is not involved. Adultery does not include
bestiality, for the requirement of "another person" is lacking.104
(iii) Sexual intercourse
It is clear that to constitute adultery intercourse need not be com-
plete. 105 Partial, or quasi-sexual, intercourse will suffice.' 06 Indeed on "the
authorities adultery is committed even if there is only a slight degree of
penetration, .. .,.07 Accordingly evidence that a woman against whom
adultery is alleged is virgo intacta is not necessarily inconsistent with a finding
of adultery, though a very heavy burden of proof rests upon the party alleging
adultery.108 There is, however, a question whether adultery requires penetra-
tion. In Russell v. Russell Lord Dunedin had stated that "... fecundation
ab extra is, I doubt not, adultery". 109 This dictum, and a dictum by Lord
Birkenhead in Rutherford v. Richardson,"0 influenced decisions in Aus-
100 Moss v. Moss [1897] P. 263; A. v. B. (1905), 3 W.L.R. 113, 120 (Man.).
101 Charlton v. Charlton [1952] P. 169.
102 Abson v. Abson [1952] P. 55.
103 Graveson and Crane, A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW, (1957), 181-182.
104 Babineau v. Babineau (1924), 51 N.B.R. 501; G. v. G. (1956), 20 W.W.R.
352 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.).
105 Sapsford v. Sapsford [1954] P. 394; Dennis v. Dennis [1955] P. 153.
106 Thompson v. Thompson [1939] P. 1.
107 Forster v. Forster [1955] 4 D.L.R. 710 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 724 per Schroeder J.A.
108 Jolly v. Jolly (1919), 63 Sol. Jo. 777; Chalmers v. Chalmers (1930), 46 T.L.R.
269; Thompson v. Thompson [19391 P. 1.; Forster v. Forster [1955] 4. D.L.R. 710, 724(Ont. C.A.).
109 [1924] A.C. 687, 721.
110 [19231 A.C. 1, 11. Also see, Chalmers v. Chalmers [1930] P. 154; Anthony v.
Anthony (1919), 35 T.L.R. 559; Snowman v. Snowman [1934] P. 186.
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tralia"' and New Zealand 1 2 to deny that penetration was essential. Recently,
however, English cases have decided that there must be some penetration.
In Dennis v. Dennis, Singleton L. J. said:" 3
I do not think that it can be said that adultery is proved unless there be some
penetration. It is not necessary that the complete act of sexual intercourse should
take place. If there is penetration by the man of the woman, adultery may be
found, but if there is no more than an attempt, I do not think that a finding of
adultery would be right.
According to this view an attempt at intercourse, or some lesser act of
sexual gratification, without any penetration is insufficient.
In MacLennan v. MacLennan the Court of Session of Scotland held that
artificial insemination did not constitute adultery: 114
Just as artificial insemination extracts procreation entirely from the nexus of human
relationships in or outside of marriage, so does the extraction of the nexus of human
relationship from the act of procreation remove artifiicial insemination from the
classification of sexual intercourse.... The introduction of a spurious element into
the family, with all its consequences, may be the result of such conduct, but is not
a necessary result, and it is by the means and not by the result that this issue is to
be judged. If artificial insemination by a donor were to be regarded as adultery,
then I opine the view that it would be adultery whether the seed germinated or not,
and yet in the latter case there would be no resultant adulteration of the strain.
The Court reviewed the English cases and reached its conclusion primarily by
an acceptance of the view there crystallized that some penetration is required.
Against this stands the early case of Orford v. Orford,115 a decision of the
Ontario High Court. This was a claim for alimony and the defence by the
husband was, inter alia, the wife's adultery. The Court found that the plain-
tiff had committed adultery but proceeded to consider also the wife's
contention that it was not adultery for a woman to become artificially insemi-
nated by means of a man other than her husband and without her husband's
knowledge. In deciding that this did constitute adultery, Orde J. said: 116
In my judgment, the essence of the offence of adultery consists, not in the
moral turpitude of the act of sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary surrender to
another person of the reproductive powers or faculties of the guilty person; and
any submission of those powers to the service or enjoyment of any person other
than the husband or the wife comes within the definition of "adultery".
III McKinnon v. McKinnon [1942] S.A.S.R. 107.
112 A. v. A. and C. v. C., both reported [1943] N.Z.L.R. 45. See, Inglis, FAM LY
LAw, (1968), 2nd ed., 96.
113 [1955] P. 153, 160. Explaining Rutherford v. Richardson [1923] A.C. 1. Also see,
Sapsford v. Sapsford [1954] P. 394; Locke v. Locke (1956), 95 Comm. Law Rep. 165.
See too, Chouinard v. Chouinard (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 582.
114 [1958] S.C. 105, 113-114 per Lord Wheatley. Generally see, Tallin, Artificial
Insemination, (1956), 34 CAN. B. Rxv. 1, 166; Hubbard, Artificial Insemination: A Reply
to Dean Tallin, (1956), 34 CAN. B. REv. 425; Payne, Artificial Human Insemination,
(1958), 12 N.I.L.Q. 252; Bartholomew, Legal Implications of Artificial Insemination,
(1958), 21 MOD. L. REv., 236. Also Report of the Royal Commission on Marriage and
Divorce, 1951-1955, (1956), Cmd. 9678, paras. 72, 73, 90; Report of the Departmental
Committee on Human Artificial Insemination, (1960), Cmd. 1105, see Pollard, (1961),
24 MOD. L. REv. 158.
"5 (1921), 49 O.L.R. 15.
16 Id., 22-23.
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The judgment is grounded upon the view that extra-marital sexual intercourse
by a wife is adulterous because it involves the possibility of introducing into
the family of the husband a false strain of blood. Consequently any act on
her part which produces such a possibility is likewise adulterous.
It is possible to contend that the Divorce Act, 1968 was enacted in light
of the decision of Orford v. Orford and that Parliament must be presumed
to have intended that the word "adultery" in see. 3 (a) should be interpreted
in accord with this decision. Having regard to the cases mentioned above,
this matter cannot be regarded as beyond dispute. At root the issue involved
is one of policy. What seems required is an elaboration of the purpose
designed to be served by the creation, and retention, of adultery as a ground for
divorce. In 1963 artificial insemination without the husband's consent, as a
ground for divorce by the husband, was introduced by statute into New
Zealand law.117 The insertion of a like provision in the Divorce Act, 1968
would perhaps have been welcomed as an entirely appropriate resolution of
this difficult question.
(iv) Standard of proof
Adultery is a fact." 8 Until 1950 the standard of proof required to
establish adultery could not be stated with certainty. Adultery was, historically,
an ecclesiastic offence and the question which lingered on was whether a
petition for divorce based upon this ground partook the nature of a criminal
action and so required proof beyond all reasonable doubt. 1 9 In England
the position still seems somewhat uncertain. 20 In George v. George,121 how-
117The Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1963. Sec. 21: "Grounds of divorce-
(1) A petition for divorce, whether the marriage is governed by New Zealand law or
not, may be presented to the Court on one or more of the following grounds, and on
no other ground: .... (b) That the respondent, being the wife of the petitioner, has
since the solemnisation of the marriage and without the consent of the petitioner been
artificially inseminated with the semen of some man other than the petitioner: . .
Inglis, op. cit. 117.
11s Horton v. Horton [1953] 2 D.L.R. 231 (Ont. H.C.).
119 An action for divorce is, in England, a civil action: Mordaunt v. Moncreiffe
(1874), L.R. 2 H.L. Sc. & Div. 374. But see, Bolster v. Bolster [1953] 1 D.L.R. 18
(N.B.S.C. App. Div.), at p. 19 per Richards CJ.: "It is said by counsel for the respon-
dent that in New Brunswick adultery is a misdemeanour by virtue of the unrepealed
section 3 of 1854 (N.B.), c. 145 (Consolidated Statutes of New Brunswick 1903, p.
2397) and such an action is triable by indictment as in a criminal case. That is true;
in this Province the charge of adultery, per se, is triable by indictment: ...
120Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones [1951] A.C. 391; Blyth v. Blyth [1966] A.C.
643; Ginesi v. Ginesi 1948] P. 179. In Bastable v. Bastable [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1684,
Willmer L.J., at p. 1686, said: "It will be seen, therefore, that for us who sit in this
court it is not altogether easy to determine exactly what standard of proof should be
applied in relation to proof of a matrimonial offence such as adultery." As to Australia,
see Briginshaw v. Briginshaw (1938), 60 Comm. Law Rep. 336; Wright v. Wright (1948),
77 Comm. Law Rep. 191: now Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959, secs. 69, 96. Generally,
Toose, Watson and Benjafield, op. cit., 115-117. Also ANNUAL SURVY OF COMMON-
wEALTH LAw, 1966, (1967), 753-754.
121 [1950] O.R. 787.
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ever, the Ontario Court of Appeal had no doubt in holding that the standard
of proof was that required in a civil action only. Two years later in Smith v.
Smith, 22 Locke J., delivering the judgment of the majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada, in an "exhaustive judgment", 23 arrived at the same conclu-
sion and so settled the law of British Columbia. In 1955 in Boykowych v. Boy-
kowych, this view was reiterated and held applicable to Ontario. Kerwin
C.J. said:
2 4
In Smith v. Smith & Smedman this Court decided that by virtue of the English
Law Act,..., the law in force in British Columbia in divorce and matrimonial
causes is The Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (Imp.), as amended....,
and that under that law proceedings in divorce in that province are civil and not
criminal in their nature and the standard of proof of the commission of a marital
offence, where no question affecting the legitimacy of offspring arises, was the
same as in other civil actions, i.e., a preponderance of evidence. The same rule
applies in Ontario under the Divorce Act (Ontario)....
This rule has been applied in other provinces.2 5 And the standard of proof
is not altered merely because a claim for damages for criminal conversation
is joined with divorce proceedings. 12 6 The evidence, however, should "be
convincing". 127 The judicial mind must "be satisfied". 128 The proceedings
will fail if the court is not reasonably satisfied on the evidence that adultery
was committed: 129 this even though the court does not say that adultery was
122 [1952] 2 S.C.R. 312. See, Adolph v. Adolph (1964), 51 W.W.R. 42 (B.C.C.A.);
Sacker v. Sacker (1956), 5 D.L.R. (2d) 552 (B.C.S.C.). Also Re Robb and Council of
Dental Surgeons of British Columbia (1964), 46 D.L.R. (2d) 202 (B.C.S.C.).
123 Forster v. Forster [1955] 4 D.L.R. 710, 719 (Ont. C.A.).
124 [1955] S.C.R. 151, 153. See Horton v. Horton [1953] 2 D.L.R. 231 (Ont. H.C.);
Forster v. Forster [1955] 4 D.L.R. 710 (Ont. C.A.). Also Rainsberry v. Rainsberry
[1954] O.W.N. 28; Klinck v. Klinck [1954] O.W.N. 124. See too Elder v. The City of
Kingston [1954] O.R. 397; Adare v. Fairplay [1956] O.R. 188.
125 McKay v. McKay (1953), 8 W.W.R. 362 (Man. C.A.); Bolster v. Bolster [1953]
1 D.L.R. 18 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.); McDonald v. McDonald (1960), 45 M.P.R. 258
(N.B.S.C. App. Div.); Furlong v. Furlong (1963), 44 D.L:R. (2d) 594 (N.B.S.C. App.
Div.); MacKinnon v. MacKinnon [1953] 2 D.L.R. 681 (N.S.S.C.); Rhodenizer v.
Rhodenizer [1953] 2 D.L.R. 99 (N.S.S.C.); Dorey v. Demone (1956), 6 D.L.R. (2d)
296 (N.S.S.C.); Chung v. Chung (1966), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 526 (N.S.S.C. App. Div.);
Mossing v. Mossing (1954), 11 W.W.R. 643 (Sask. C.A.); Deptuck v. Deptuck (1966),
56 D.L.R. (2d) 634, 641 (Sask. Q.B.). In civil actions the standard of proof in Quebec
would seem to be exactly the same as in common law jurisdictions: Ratte v. Provencher
(1964), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 756 (S.C.).
126 Boykowych v. Boykowych [1955] S.C.R. 151.
127 McDonald v. McDonald (1960), 45 M.P.R. 258, 260 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.).
128 George v. George [1950] O.R. 787, at p. 797 per Roach J.A. The passage reads:
"The judicial mind must be 'satisfied' that the alleged act of adultery was in fact
committed, but it need not be satisfied to the extent of a moral certainty as in a
criminal case. Evidence that creates only suspicion, surmise or conjecture is, of
course, insufficient. It is necessary that the quality and quantity of the evidence must
be such as leads the tribunal-be it judge or jury-acting with care and caution, to
the fair and reasonable conclusion that the act was committed." This passage was
approved by Cartwright J. in Smith v. Smith [1952] 2 S.C.R. 312. Also see, Adolph v.
Adolph (1964), 51 W.W.R. 42 (B.C.C.A.).
129 Adolph v. Adolph (1964), 51 W.W.R. 42 (B.C.C.A.); McDonald v. McDonald
(1960), 45 M.P.R. 258 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.); Dorey v. Demone (1956), 6 D.L.R. (2d)
296 (N.S.S.C.); Horton v. Horton [1953] 2 D.L.R. 231 (Ont. H.C.).
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not committed. 3 0 But a doubt as to whether or not adultery has been
committed is not sufficient ground for dismissing a petition."'1 However, as
stated by Kerwin C.J. in the extract cited above, the Supreme Court in the
Smith case dealt with the standard of proof where "no question affecting the
legitimacy of offspring arises." It appears clear that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is required when a divorce is sought on evidence which, if accepted,
would bastardize a child born during the continuance of the marriage. 131a
(v) Inference of adultery
It is a "fundamental rule"' 32 that it is not necessary to prove the
direct fact of adultery: this can be inferred from circumstances that lead to
it by fair inference as a proper conclusion. 1"' As has been said: 134
It has been said many times that it is not necessary that the parties be
surprised in the act of adultery; the fact of adultery may be inferred, and in most
cases it is inferred, from circumstances that lead to it as a necessary conclusion.
For example, where a court accepts the evidence of a wife that she had not
had intercourse with anyone other than her husband and that she had been
infected with venereal disease by her husband."35 But the inference of adultery
should always be drawn with caution. There must be more than mere
opportunity: there must be proof that the opportunity was used. 13 The fact,
130Dorey v. Demone (1956), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 296 (N.S.S.C.), at p. 301 per
Currie J.: "I do not say that the defendants have not committed adultery together.
My conclusion is, I am not satisfied there is that proof upon the evidence that is
required where adultery is in issue."
131 MacKinnon v. MacKinnon [1953] 2 D.L.R. 681 (N.S.S.C.). The existence of a
dum casta clause does not, it seems, affect the standard of proof. The fact, however, of
the clauses's existence might be considered as relevant evidence for the defence, tending
to show the improbability that the offence alleged had been committed. See Rainsberry
v. Rainsberry [1954] O.W.N. 28. McLennan J., however, based his reasoning upon a
passage from the judgment of Roach J.A. in Boykowych v. Boykowych which was
critical of a passage of the judgment of Cartwright J. in Smith v. Smith [1952] 2 S.C.R.
312. However, see Boykowych v. Boykowych [1955] S.C.R. 151, 154-155. The courts
very closely scrutinize the evidence of paid private detectives: Little v. Little [1958]
S.C.R. 566. Also see, Ciocci v. Ciocci (1854), 18 fur. 194, 198; Sopwith v. Sopwith
(1859), 4 Sw. & Tr. 245, 246. An extra degree of scrutiny must be accorded to those
who act without a required licence despite knowledge of the relevant legislation: such
evidence may not be accepted unless it is "fully and strongly corroborated and the
defence fails to adduce convincing evidence to refute the charges": La Marche v. La
Marche [1961] O.W.N. 15, at p. 16 per Spence J. Also, Williamson v. Williamson
(1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 717 (B.C.S.C.); Klassen v. Klassen (1967), 62 W.W.R. 192
(Man. C.A.); Lemenson v. Lemenson (1969), 70 W.W.R. 749 (Man. Q.B.).
i3laIrish v. Irish (1958), 24 W.W.R. 671 (B.C.S.C.); Loewen v. Loewen (1969),
5 D.L.R. (3d) 95 (B.C.S.C.). Also Welstead v. Brown [1952] S.C.R. 3; Huiser v. Huiser
[1962] O.W.N. 220; Himmelman v. Himmelman (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 291 (N.S.S.C.).
132 Adolph v. Adolph (1964), 51 W.W.R. 42, 45 (B.C.C.A.).
133Loveden v. Loveden (1810), 2 Hag. Con. 1; Adolph v. Adolph (1964), 51
W.W.R. 42 (B.C.C.A.); Chouinard v. Chouinard (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 582.
134 Klinck v. Klinck [1954] O.W.N. 124, at p. 126 per Hogg J.A., delivering thei
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
135 Borden v. Borden (1957), 23 W.W.R. 447 (Man. Q.B.). Also, Stead v. Stead
(1927), 71 Sol. Jo. 391; L. v. L. [1943] 2 W.W.R. 136 (Alta. S.C.); Wilson v. Wilson
[1943] 2 W.W-R. 267 (Man. C.A.); M. v. M. [1933] O.W.N. 116.
136Horton v. Horton [1953] 2 D.L.R. 231 (Ont. H.C.). Also, Mogen v. Mogen
[1948] 2 W.W.R. 1151 (Alta. S.C.); Simmons v. Simmons [1949] O.W.N. 744.
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however, that a woman is virgo intacta is not necessarily conclusive against
a finding of adultery;13 7 for partial intercourse will suffice.' 38
(vi) Appeal
A trial judge enjoys the advantage of hearing and observing the
witnesses. The position of an appeal court when asked to review a finding
of fact made by a judge sitting alone has been the subject of "voluminous
case law". 139. In Little v. Little, Locke J. said:
140
There is no doubt that the learned judges of the Court of Appeal, even in cases
where the issue depends upon the veracity of the witnesses, are not only empowered
but that it is their duty to overrule the findings at the trial if, bearing in mind the
principles to which I have above referred, they are satisfied that the trial judge has
failed to use the advantage afforded to him of having seen the witnesses and observed
their demeanour in the witness-box in coming to his conclusion and that it is
clearly wrong....
Sullivan J. clearly scrutinized the evidence of these investigators with great
care: there is no justification, in my opinion, for concluding that he overlooked any
of the relevant evidence in the case, and to say that he was so clearly wrong that
the judgment of the Court of Appeal on the facts should be substituted for his I
consider to be error.
Where a divorce petition is dismissed on the ground of insufficient evidence
to establish the allegation of adultery, an appeal court should not disturb this
dismissal unless convinced that the trial judge was clearly wrong.141 This rule
applies "with equal force" where the petition has been granted.142 However,
a divorce is not to be refused "merely because there is conflicting" evidence,
and the decision below may be upset if the trial judge is held to have
approached the consideration of the material evidence from a mistaken view-
point.143 So too if the only inference that can properly be drawn from the
proved circumstances is that, as alleged, adultery was committed. 4 4 But if a
wrong principle has been applied below and the appeal court is unable to
evaluate the evidence, a new trial may be ordered.145 So too if the appeal
court finds that there is some good and special reason to throw doubt upon
'37Generally, Rutherford v. Richardson [1923] A.C. 1; Hunt v. Hunt (1856),
Dea. & Sw. 121. As to alleged adultery during menstruation, see Forster v. Forster
[1955] 4 D.L.R. 710, 725 (Ont. C.A.).
138 See pp. 24-25 ante.
139 Forster v. Forster [1955] 4 D.L.R. 710 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 725 per Schroeder
J.A.
140 [1958] S.C.R. 566, 575-576, delivering the judgment of Locke, Cartwright and
Martland, JJ. Also, Powell et ux v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] A.C. 243;
Watt or Thomas v. Thomas [1947] A.C. 484.
141 Romaniuk v. Romaniuk (1957), 10 D.L:R. (2d) 58 (Sask. C.A.). Also, McKay
v. McKay (1953), 8 W.W.R. 362 (Man. C.A.).
142 Furlong v. Furlong (1963), 44 D.L.R. (2d) 594 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.), at
p. 599. Also, Bateman v. Bateman (1965), 51 W.W.R. 633 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.);
Horsman v. Horsman (1950), 25 M.P.R. 163 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.).
143 Klinck v. Klinck [1954] O.W.N. 124, 127. Also Rhodenizer v. Rhodenizer
[1953] 2 D.L.R. 99 (N.S.S.C.).
144 Chung v. Chung (1966), 60 D.L:R. (2d) 526 (N.S.S.C. App. Div.).
145 MacKinnon v. MacKinnon [1953] 2 D.L.R. 681 (N.S.S.C.).
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the soundness of the trial judge's conclusions.146 It may be mentioned that
the application of the controlling principles may not always be easy to predict.
Indeed, as has been mentioned, perhaps "one may be forgiven for wondering
if authority cannot always be found to justify the course which an appellate
Court thinks it ought to follow in a particular case."'147
(vii) Effect of the Divorce Act, 1968
Sec. 20 (1) of the Divorce Act, 1968 provides that subject to this
or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, the laws of evidence of the
province in which any proceedings under the Act are taken, including the
laws of proof of service of any petition or other document, apply to such
proceedings. 4 8 Nothing in this section seems to directly affect the matters
of evidence discussed above. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
relating to the standard of proof must, however, be viewed against the back-
ground of the Imperial Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 which required that
a court should "be satisfied" on the evidence that the case for the petitioner
had been proved.149 This Act is no longer relevant. The standard of proof
of adultery must now be deduced solely from the Divorce Act, 1968. The
Act of 1968 is silent on this point for see. 3 (a) states merely that a petition
for divorce may be presented to a court on the ground that the respondent,
since the celebration of the marriage, has "committed" adultery. There seems,
however, no reason to suppose that see. 3 (a) of the Act of 1968 will be
construed otherwise than in accord with the Smith and Boykowych cases, and
that the words "has committed" adultery will be construed otherwise than as
requiring the civil standard of proof.149a
(b) Sodomy, bestiality or rape
By sec. 3 (b) a petition may be presented to the court on the
ground that the respondent has been guilty of sodomy, bestiality or rape, or
has engaged in a homosexual act. Such conduct, however, must have taken
place since the celebration of the marriage. Under the Imperial Act of 1857,
and in jurisdictions wherein this Act had been received, rape, sodomy or
bestiality were formerly grounds for divorce, but only at the suit of a wife.
Under sec. 3 (b) they are made available at the suit of husband or wife and,
in addition, sec. 3 (b) includes the expression "or has engaged in a homosexual
act". The Act does not define the meaning of this phrase; nor the meaning of
the words "sodomy, bestiality or rape".
146 Forster v. Forster [1955] 4 D.L.R. 710 (Ont. C.A.). Also, Parrington v. Par-
rington [1952] O.W.N. 43.
147 Forster v. Forster [1955] 4 D.L.R. 710 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 725 per Schroeder J.A.
148 See, inter alia, sec. 21 of the Divorce Act, 1968 relating to admissions and
communications made in the course of reconciliation proceedings. See also secs. 17 and
18 relating to appeals.
149 20 & 21 Viet., c. 85, see. 31. See, George v. George [1950] O.R. 787. Also, the
Marriage and Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 176, sec. 5. This Act of 1952 has been
repealed in part by see. 24 of the Divorce Act, 1968, and is now the Marriage Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 176. See also Lemenson v. Lemenson (1969), 70 W.W.1L 749 (Man. Q.B.).
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Sodomy 50 and bestiality have been the subject of definition at common
law and rape is defined in the Criminal Code.151 Presumably this is the way
in which sec. 3 (b) will be interpreted. Indeed the Report of the Special Joint
Committee was of the view that a statutory definition of these marital offences
was "unnecessary and undesirable". 152 Where sodomy is committed upon a
wife, her consent has been held to be a defence.15 3 But the consent must be
a "real consent". 54 The onus of proving such consent rests upon the husband,
and the standard of proof required is the balance of probabilities.155 It has
been said that the allegation of sodomy is an accusation which no court "will
find proved' 156 unless it is corroborated. However, though courts look "most
anxiously"' 57 for corroboration, and usually there is held to be corrobora-
tion, 158 corroboration, in this context, is not required as a matter of law.15 9
Generally if a husband is guilty of rape he will also have committed adultery.
However, circumstances may exist where this does not necessarily follow:
for example, a husband may be guilty as a party to the offence of the rape
of his wife by another man.160 Perhaps a husband-or even possibly a wife
-may likewise be a party to the offence of the rape of another woman;
161
and, if this is so, may be thereby "guilty of... rape" so as to satisfy sec. 3 (b).
The expression "or has engaged in a homosexual act" raises further
difficulty for it lacks a heretofore established meaning. It may be that this
expression includes conduct which would not constitute "sodomy". Being
available to either spouse it may, perhaps, also encompass acts of lesbianism.
In any event, the precise content of these words cannot be stated with
149a See Bustin v. Bustin (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 496 where at p. 498 the Court said:
"In fact, I find that there is no evidence of adultery which would satisfy me by any
preponderance of evidence."
150 Generally, Milner, "Sodomy as a Ground for Divorce," (1960), 23 MOD. L. REv.
43.
151 S.C., 1953-54, as amended, see. 135.
152 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND HousE oF
COMMONS ON DIVORCE, op. cit., 105.
153 Stratham v. Stratham [1929] P. 131; Brampton v. Brampton [1959] 1 W.L.R.
842. Also see, Ives v. Ives [1968] 2 W.L.R. 807, 819-820. Absent consent, this conduct
by a husband may constitute cruelty; Cesae v. Cesale (1920), 54 N.S.R. 91.
154 Brampton v. Brampton [1959] 1 W.L.R. 842; T. v. T. [1964] P. 85. Also,
Davidson v. Davidson [1953] 1 W.L.R. 387; Lawson v. Lawson [1955] 1 W.L.R. 200.
155 Keogh v. Keogh [1962] 1 W.L.R. 191.
156 Id., at p. 192 per Wrangham J.
157 Lawson v. Lawson [1955] 1 W.L.R. 200, at p. 206 per Hodson L.J
158 Warden v. Warden [1951] 3 D.L.R. 336 (Ont. H.C.): the fact that the husband
does not answer the charge provides some corroboration.
159 Lawson v. Lawson [1955] 1 W.L.R. 200. Also, Davidson v. Davidson [1953]
1 W.L.R. 387; F. v. F. [1950] 2 W.W.R. 54 (Alta. S.C.).
160 Discussed R. v. Harder [1956] S.C.R. 489. See, Criminal Code, S.C., 1953-54,
as amended, sec. 21. It does not appear that a husband can rape his wife otherwise
than as a party to the offence: see. 135. C.f. the position in English law; see R. v. Miller
[1954] 2 Q.B. 282; generally, Graveson and Crane, op. cit., 181-184.
161See, R. v. Harder [1956] S.C.R. 489. See, Graveson and Crane, op. cit.,
181-182.
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certainty. It should however be mentioned that unnatural or perverted
practices, by either a husband 162 or a wife,163 can be taken into account as part
of a course of conduct amounting to cruelty.
It is to be noted that sec. 3 (a) speaks of a respondent having "commit-
ted" adultery; whereas sec. 3 (b) talks of a respondent as having "been guilty
of' sodomy, bestiality or rape.164 Is this change in terminology significant? Do
the words "been guilty of" connote the requirement that the respondent should
have been charged and convicted of a criminal offence? This was not, it
seems, necessary under the Imperial Act of 1857.165 The words used in sec.
3 (b) do not appear to require any different construction; and indeed they
must now be read subject to the changes in the law effected by the Criminal
Law Amendment Act, 1968-69.166 If this is so, if a conviction is not required,
there is still a question as to the standard of proof. From the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Hanes v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co.
167
it appears that, in a civil action the existence of a fact which, if established,
would constitute a criminal offence, need be proved only on the balance of
probabilities. In Smith v. Smith, Cartwright J. said: 168
I wish, however, to emphasize that in every civil action before the
tribunal can safely find the affirmative of an issue of fact required to be
proved it must be reasonably satisfied, and that whether or not it will
be so satisfied must depend upon the totality of the circumstances on
which its judgment is formed including the gravity of the consequences
of the finding.
This passage was cited in the majority judgment in Hanes v. Wawanesa Mutual
Insurance Co. The nature and gravity of the consequences which flow from
a finding of adultery are of a quite different order from those which follow
upon a finding that the respondent was "guilty of" sodomy, bestiality or rape:
162 Countway v. Countway (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 73 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes); Arthur v. Arthur (1964), 108 Sol. Jo. 317.
163 Gardiner v. Gardiner [1947] 1 All E.R. 630; Spicer v. Spicer [1954] 1 W.L.R.
1051; Coffer v. Coffer (1964), 108 Sol. Jo. 465.
164 This follows the pattern in the English Act; the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965,
c. 72, sec. 1. (By see. 1 (b), however, rape, sodomy or bestiality are available only
to a wife). Contrast the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959-66, see. 28: "com-
mitted adultery"; "committed rape, sodomy or bestiality", available to both parties.
Also contrast the New Zealand Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1963, as amended, sec. 21:
"guilty of adultery"; "committed rape or sodomy or bestiality", available only to a
wife.
165 Virgo v. Virgo (1893), 69 L.T. 460 (P.D.A.); Coffey v. Coffey [1898] P. 169.
Also, Warden v. Warden [1951] 3 D.L.R. 336 (Ont. H.C.).
166 See. 7 amends the Criminal Code by inserting sec. 149A which excepts certain
conduct from the provisions of sec. 147, which applies to buggery and bestiality, and
sec. 149, which applies to acts of gross indecency.
167 [1963] S.C.R. 154. Also Le Blanc v. MacDonald (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 132
(N.S.S.C.). But see, Warden v. Warden [1951] 3 D.L.R. 336 (Ont. H.C.); F. v. F.
[1950] 2 W.W.R. 54 (Alta. S.C.); Fast v. Fast [1945] 3 W.W.R. 66 (B.C.S.C.).
168 [1952] 2 S.C.R. 312, 331-332. Italics supplied. Also, Boykowych v. Boykowych
[1955] S.C.R. 151, 154-155. See too, Bater v. Bater [1951] P. 35; Bastable v. Bastable
[1968] 1 W.L.R. 1684; Briginshaw v. Briginshaw (1938), 60 Comm. Law Rep. 336.
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or that the respondent had "engaged in" a homosexual act. As the degree
of social repugnance varies, so also should the degree of probability required
to establish proof: in "proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof
to be clear". 169 Possibly this may be the approach that the courts will adopt
to establish proof of conduct contained in sec. 3 (b).
(c) Bigamous marriages
A husband or wife who, since the celebration of the marriage, has
gone through a form of marriage with another person, provides his or her
spouse with a ground for divorce under see. 3 (c). This ground is constituted
by the husband or wife so going "through a form of marriage with another
person". Under the prior law a divorce could have been obtained by proving
adultery consequent upon the bigamous form of marriage. If adultery can so
be established this will constitute a ground for divorce under sec. 3 (a). By
sec. 3 (c), however, proof of the first marriage and of the second form of
marriage is all that is needed, i.e. proof of adultery is not required.
A valid polygamous marriage is presumably outside the contemplation
of this paragraph. A husband may be domiciled in a jurisidiction where poly-
gamy is permitted and may marry in this jurisdiction two wives. The first wife
may subsequently acquire a Canadian domicile and otherwise satisfy the
jurisidictional requirements of the Act.'70 She cannot, it is considered,
successfully petition for divorce under see. 3 (c), relying merely upon the
second marriage. For the second ceremony would not appear to be a "form
of marriage" within the meaning of sec. 3 (c) but to be, rather, a perfectly
valid polygamous marriage. Futher there is no reason to suppose that sec.
3 (c) was meant to abrogate in this way the rule in Hyde v. Hyde,171 namely
that the courts do not have jurisdiction to dissolve a polygamous marriage.
172
The words "with another person" indicate, no doubt, that sec. 3 (c)
also has no application to a form of marriage entered into between parties
who are already married. For example, where husband and wife, married
by a civil ceremony, subsequently go through a religious ceremony of mar-
riage.
Neither circumstance here discussed seems to disclose matrimonial
fault, and this appears a necessary ingredient of conduct prescribed as a
ground for divorce under sec. 3.
(d) Cruelty
Physical or mental cruelty of such a kind as to render intolerable
the continued cohabitation of the spouses is enacted as a ground for divorce
by sec. 3 (d). The degree of proof has, rightly it is considered, already been
169 Blyth v. Blyth [19661 A.C. 643, at p. 669 per Lord Denning M.R.
170 See, Mendes da Costa, "Some Comments", see footnote 13.
171 (1866), L.R. 1 P. & D. 130.
172 Generally, Mendes da Costa, "Polygamous Marriages in the Conflict of Laws,"
(1966), 44 CAN. B. REv. 293.
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stated to be not greater than that required in an ordinary civil action.1 3 Sec.
3 (d) requires that the respondent should have treated the petitioner with
cruelty since the celebration of the marriage. Conduct prior to the marriage
cannot therefore, of itself, amount to cruelty, though it may be material in
considering whether later conduct can be held to be cruel.'1 4 Cruelty is not
defined in the Act and the Report of the Special Joint Committee stated that
cruelty has never been satisfactorily defined.1 5 Indeed it has been said to be
impossible to give a comprehensive definition of cruelty; 1 6 and the English
and Canadian courts have studiously avoided a precise legal determination
of the limits of this concept.
77
For a better understanding of sec. 3 (d) it is necessary to briefly sketch
the concept of "cruelty" in contexts other than the Divorce Act, 1968.
(i) Matrimonial cruelty in contexts other than the Divorce Act, 1968
While cruelty may never have been satisfactorily defined, it is clear
that it is a word which in matrimonial law has meaning.1 8 This meaning is a
creation of judge-made law, a process which dates back at least to the "well-
known"1 9 decision of Lord Stowell in Evans v. Evans.180 In the words of
Lord Pearce:'
81
From the days of Lord Stowell down to the present it has been acknowledged
that to support a finding of cruelty the matter must be grave and weighty. And
in Russell v. Russell this House finally settled that conduct must, in order to
constitute cruelty in the legal acceptance of the term, be such as to cause danger
to life, limb, or health, bodily or mental, or to give rise to a reasonable apprehension
of such danger. (See Lord Merriman in Jamieson v. Jamieson.)
Thus there have long been two safeguards against any extension of relief to
cases founded on mere trivialities and incompatibility.
Cruelty therefore comprises two components: danger, or a reasonable appre-
hension of danger, to life, limb or health-the so-called "doctrine of danger"
-and also the requirement that the conduct must be grave and weighty.
Given these two components, cruelty has no "esoteric and certainly no arti-
17' Zalesky v. Zalesky (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 471 (Man. Q.B.). Also Bustin v.
Bustin (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 496.
14 Carpenter v. Carpenter [1955] 1 W.L.R. 669. C.f. Phillips v. Phillips [1962]
O.R. 242 (Ont. H.C.).
175 Generally see, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITEE OF THE SENATE AND
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON DIVORCE, op. cit., 105-107.
176 Gollins v. Gollins [1964] A.C. 644, at p. 695 per Lord Pearce. Also see p. 658.
177 Hutton v. Hutton (1957), 40 M.P.R. 135 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes).
178 Delaney v. Delaney (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 303 (B.C.S.C.), at p. 308 per
Tyrwhitt-Drake, Co.Ct.J.: "Cruelty is a word which in matrimonial law has meaning:
it has been carefully defined and exhaustively applied to a variety of situations co-
extensive only with the sanguinary ingenuity of humankind. For examples, see 12 Hals.,
3rd ed., pp. 269 et seq."
179 Cole v. Cole (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 643 (N.S.S.C.).
180 (1790), 1 Hag. Con. 35.
181 Gollins v. Gollins [1964] A.C. 644, 686-687.
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ficial meaning"'82 in divorce law. And the categories of cruelty, it has been
pointed out, are not closed.183 Each case of cruelty must be decided on its
own facts.184 As stated by Currie J.:185
The alleged acts of cruelty may be taken as a series or individually, and the totality
of their effect upon the physical or mental well-being of the aggrieved spouse be then
determined.
Nothing is to be gained by listing the authorities, but reference should be
made to two "landmark cases of impressive authority."' 86 In Gollins v.
Gollins,187 the House of Lords held that an intention on the part of one spouse
to injure the other was not a necessary element of cruelty as a matrimonial
offence. In Williams v. Williams'88 this same tribunal also recently determined
that insanity is not necessarily a defence to a charge of cruelty. These authori-
ties have been considered by a growing number of Canadian courts. 8 9 In
jurisdictions where they are accepted some earlier cases will no doubt require
reconsideration.
This interpretation of cruelty in a matrimonial sense, which may be
termed the Russell v. Russell test, has been generally adhered to in Canadian
common law jurisdictions: except Alberta and Saskatchewan. Thus, prior to
the Act of 1968, cruelty was a ground for divorce in Nova Scotia and this was
the way in which this concept was interpreted. 9 0 Further the Russell v.
182 Le Brocq v. Le Brocq [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1085, at p. 1096 per Salmon L. J.
183 Sheldon v. Sheldon [1966] P. 62, at p. 71 per Lord Denning M.R.
184 Roach v. Roach [1944] 1 D.L.R. 481 (B.C.C.A.); Shamper v. Shamper (1956),
4 D.L.R. (2d) 760 (B.C.C.A.); Maxwell v. Maxwell (1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 725
(B.C.S.C.); Desautels v. Desautels (1954), 11 W.W.R. 142 (Man. C.A.); Stewart v.
Stewart [1945] 1 D.L.R. 500 (N.S.S.C.).
185 Hutton v. Hutton (1957), 40 M.P.R. 135 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes).
186 White v. White (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 60 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matri-
monial Causes), at p. 64 per McLellan J.
187 [1964] A.C. 644. Applied in White v. White (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 60 (N.S.
Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes); N. v. N. (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 639 (B.C.S.C.)
See, Cuthbert v. Cuthbert (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 637 (Ont. C.A.). Generally, Neville
Brown, Cruelty without Culpability or Divorce without Fault, (1963), 26 MoD. L. Rnv.
625.
188 [1964] A.C. 698. See, Herman v. Herman (1969), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 551 (N.S.S.C.);
N. v. N. (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 639 (B.C.S.C.). Also White v. White (1968), 69 D.L.R.
(2d) 60 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes); Webster v Dame McKay
[1969] C.S. 132. But see Bustin v. Bustin (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 496. C.f. Green v. Green
(1963), 49 M.P.R. 315 (Nfl. C.A.).
189 Herman v. Herman (1969), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 551 (N.S.S.C.); White v. White
(1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 60 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes); Cuthbert
v. Cuthbert (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 637 (Ont. C.A.).
190 Gilbert v. Gilbert (1947), 21 M.P.R. 76 (N.S.C.A.); Stewart v. Stewart [1945]
1 D.L.R. 500 (N.S.S.C.); Connelly v. Connelly [1955] 2 D.L.R. 73 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce
and Matrimonial Causes); Clattenburg v. Clattenburg [1955] 2 D.L.R. 272 (N.S. Ct.
for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes); Fralick v. Fralick (1957), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 346
(N.S.S.C.); Hutton v. Hutton (1957), 40 M.P.R. 135 (N.S. CL for Divorce and Matri-
monial Causes); Cole v. Cole (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 643 (N.S.S.C.); White v. White
(1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 60 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes); Countway
v. Countway (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 73 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes).
Also, MacNeil v. MacNell (1967), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 171 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes).
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Russell test has controlled and, apparently, will continue to control, the
meaning of cruelty in Ontario in applications by a wife for alimony.19' So too,
it would seem, in provinces other than Alberta and Saskatchewan in relation
to suits for judicial separation based upon cruelty. 192 A very considerable
body of judicial experience has therefore been acquired in the disposition of
diverse kinds of matrimonial causes based upon cruelty as here described.
Indeed, there is a "veritable legion of decided cases which preceded and have
followed Russell v. Russell".193 There is no doubt that, under the prior law,
the "doctrine of danger" had become firmly embedded in the fabric of the
matrimonial law of the majority of Canadian jurisdictions; and that, in these
jurisdictions, a well-known meaning, if not definition, had long been assigned
to the interpretation of this term.
Alberta and Saskatchewan
Statutes in Alberta 94 and Saskatchewan 95 have defined cruelty to mean
conduct creating a danger to life, limb or health, or any course of conduct
that in the opinion of the court is grossly insulting and intolerable or is of such
a character that the person seeking relief could not reasonably be expected
or be willing to live with the other after he or she has been guilty of the
same. 196 This definition is applicable to suits for judicial separation and for
alimony. In Reves v. Reves, after referring to the difficulties produced by the
need to prove that the defendant's conduct had endangered the plaintiff's
health, Disbery J. said: 197
It was no doubt to remedy this situation that the Legislature went on to
include in its statutory definition of cruelty, upon which a judicial separation could
191 McIlwain v. MeIlwain (1916), 35 O.L.R. 532 (App. Div.); Hawn v. Hawn
[1944] 4 D.L.R. 173 (Ont. C.A.); MacDonald v. MacDonald [1954] O.R. 521 (C.A.);
Gist v. Gist (1958), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 87 (Ont. C.A.); Marshall v. Marshall (1968),
70 D.L.R. (2d) 555 (Ont. H.C.).
192 Shamper v. Shamper (1956), 4 D.L.R. (2d) 760 (B.C.C.A.); Maxwell v. Max-
well (1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 725 (B.C.S.C.); Plummer v. Plummer (1962), 31 D.L.R.
(2d) 723 (B.C.S.C.); Desautels v. Desautels (1954), 11 W.W.R. 142 (Man. C.A.);
Diamond v. Diamond (1962), 38 W.W.R. 153 (Man. Q.B.); Currey v. Currey (1910),
N.B.R. 96 (C.A.); Ritchie v. Ritchie [1953] 2 D.L.R. 730 (N.B. Ct. of Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes); Jones v. Jones [1947] 3 D.L.R. 878 (N.S.S.C.); Cole v. Cole
(1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 643 (N.S.S.C.); Pennie v. Pennie (1966), 52 M.P.R. 68 (N.S. Ct.
for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes). Also, Green v. Green (1963), 49 M.P.R. 315
(Nfl. C.A.).
193 Zalesky v. Zalesky (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 471 (Man. Q.B.), at p. 472 per
Tritschler, C.J.Q.B.
194 The Domestic Relations Act, R.S.A., 1955, c. 89, sec. 7 (2). See, Bateman v.
Bateman (1965), 51 W.W.R. 633 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.). Also, Lovett v. Lovett [1944]
3 W.W.R. 607 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.); Bell v. Bell [1945] 2 W.W.R. 618 (Alta. S.C.);
Olsen v. Olsen [1946] 3 W.W.R. 389 (Alta. S.C.); Davies v. Davies [1946] 1 W.W.R.
528 (Alta. S.C.); McKeever v. McKeever (1956), 17 W.W.R. 393 (Alta. S.C.).
195 The Queen's Bench Act, R.S.S., 1965, c. 73, sec. 25 (3). Initially, The King's
Bench Act, 1949, c. 24, see. 2.
196 Generally, Power op. cit. 485-486.
197 (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 543, 554 (Sask. Q.B.). Also, Rathgeber v. Rathgeber
(1954), 11 W.W.R. 232 (Sask. Q.B.); Paslowski v. Paslowski (1955), 17 W.W.R.
524 (Sask. Q.B.); Ostapchuk v. Ostapchuk (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 746 (Sask. Q.B.).
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be granted, two additional kinds of cruelty applicable to "course of conduct" cases.
Such are set forth above where the said s. 25 (3) is set out. If either course of
conduct is proved against a defendant, a judicial separation may be granted without
any proof as to whether or not the life, limb or health of the plaintiff was
endangered.
The inclusion of the words relating to "course of conduct" allows therefore
the granting of relief in situations which would not meet the usual definition
of cruelty as applied by the courts in matrimonial causes: 19s that is, would
not satisfy the "doctrine of danger".
Quebec
The notion of cruelty, although the word itself is not used, is also found
in the law of Quebec. Under Article 189 of the Quebec Civil Code,199 a
separation from bed and board may be demanded by a spouse on the ground
of outrage, ill-usage or grievous insult committed by one toward the other.
By Article 190 the grievous nature and sufficiency of such outrage, ill-usage or
insult are left to the discretion of the court which, in appreciating them, must
take into consideration the rank condition and other circumstances of the
parties. There has been comment comparing Article 189 with the provisions
of sec. 3 (d) of the Divorce Act, 1968.200
(ii) The Divorce Act, 1968
The first two reported cases dealing with cruelty under the Act of
1968 differed in their approach to the interpretation of sec. 3 (d). There
now appears to be two divergent interpretations of this provision.
Delaney v. Delaney: the Russell v. Russell test
In Delaney v. Delaney,201 a wife petitioned the British Columbia Supreme
Court for divorce on, inter alia, the ground of cruelty as set out in see. 3 (d).
The Court found that the husband's conduct induced an undoubted injury to
her health and, referring to Evans v. Evans and Russell v. Russell, held that
she had established uncondoned cruelty such as would entitle her to a
judgment for judicial separation. The Court then asked whether the Divorce
Act, 1968 had changed the law. As was pointed out by the Court, sec. 3 (d)
does not use the word "cruelty" alone: this word is preceded by the words
"physical or mental". To construe "cruelty" in the Russell v. Russell sense
raised the question as to the meaning, or want of meaning, attributable to the
198 Herring v. Herring (1963), 41 W.W.R. 400 (Sask. Q.B.). See too, Reves v.
Reves (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 543 (Sask. Q.B.).
199 Generally, Mignault, DRorr CIviL CANADIEN, (1896), vol. 2, 8 et seq.; Trudel,
TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL DU QUEBEC, (1942), vol. 1, 595 et seq.
200 Robert, Quelques Commentaires sur la Nouvelle Loi Concernant le Divorce,
(1968), 28 R. DU B. 513, 516-517.
201 (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 303 (B.C.S.C.).
1969]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
words "physical or mental"; for under this test "health" includes "bodily
or mental health"; that is, cruelty includes mental cruelty.202 Tyrwhitt-Drake,
Co. Ct. J. said:
203
I am not persuaded that the employment of the words "physical or mental"
as modifiers of the word "cruelty" are to have any substantive effect on its meaning.
As used in the context, they can only refer to the effect upon the petitioner of the
respondent's conduct. As it is defined, and as the definition has been hitherto applied
to conduct, cruelty embraces injury to mental as well as physical health. The phrase
"mental cruelty" despite (or perhaps because of) its imprecision has achieved a
good deal of recognition; it is now a convenient catch phrase. I can only assign
to it the meaning that it is conduct injurious to mental health, or which may reason-
ably be apprehended to be so, and "physical cruelty" is referable to similar effects,
real or apprehended, to bodily health. In my view the phrase "physical or mental
cruelty" does not import any wider definition to the word "cruelty" than that which
now obtains in matrimonial law.
In the view of the Court, therefore, the words "physical or mental cruelty"
in sec. 3 (d) bear the same meaning as did the word "cruelty" under the
prior law; at least in so far as danger, or reasonably apprehended danger, to
health, mental or physical, is required. Having construed in this way the words
"physical or mental cruelty" the Court then proceeded to consider the
meaning of the concluding phrase of sec. 3 (d); that is, that the cruelty must
be "of such a kind as to render intolerable the continued cohabitation of the
spouses". The Court stated:
20 4
More difficulty lies in determining whether success in an action based on
(physical or mental) cruelty "of such a kind as to render intolerable the continued
cohabitation of the spouses" requires proof of something more than cruelty such
as would justify judicial separation; or whether it requires the Court to take a
radically new direction and redefine cruelty as something based on the future
intolerability of cohabitation rather than on past conduct.
If the latter view is to prevail, Courts might be obliged, in some cases, to
exercise a degree of prophetic insight with which, I venture to suggest, few
Judges are endowed, and certainly none at liberty to employ. But quite apart from
this, it seems to me that if I were to hold that the task of finding cruelty is to be
approached in a radically different way from that which presently pertains, I would
be putting a very strained construction on the plain words of s. 3 (d). I would be
obliged to substitute, in effect, some such general expression as "conduct" for the
specific word "cruelty" where it occurs in the phrase concerning future cohabita-
tion....
I incline to the first alternative which I propounded, as leading to a correct
statement of the law as it now exists. The words "physical or mental cruelty" used
in s. 3 (d) have a certain meaning in law (cf., Russell v. Russell, supra); and the
phrase "of such a kind as to render intolerable the continued cohabitation of the
spouses" has the effect of requiring a petitioner to adduce such evidence of cruel
conduct as will enable the Court to conclude that, on the balance of probabilities,
continued cohabitation will be intolerable. What is intolerable to a petitioner in
any case must, I think, be determined subjectively.
2 02 King v. King [1953] A.C. 124; Atkins v. Atkins [1942] 2 All E.R. 637; Lauszuz
v. Lauszuz (1953), 11 W.W.R. 463 (B.C.S.C.); Cole v. Cole (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d)
643 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes); White v. White (1968), 69 D.L.R.
(2d) 60 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes); MacDonald v. MacDonald
[1954] O.R. 521. Also, Pennie v. Pennie (1966), 52 M.P.R. 68 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce
and Matrimonial Causes).
203 Delaney v. Delaney (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 303, 307 (B.C.S.C.).
204 Id., 307-308.
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Accordingly this interpretation of sec. 3 (d), seems to require proof of two
factors. First, danger, or reasonably apprehended danger, to mental or
physical health, and in addition such evidence of cruel conduct as will enable
a court to conclude that, on the balance of probabilities, continued cohabita-
tion will be intolerable.
Zalesky v. Zalesky: the new approach
In Zalesky v. Zalesky20 5 a wife petitioned the Manitoba Court of Queen's
Bench for divorce under see. 3 (d). The petition was dismissed but the Court
made it clear that in considering whether cruelty had been proved, it had
not been hampered by the Russell v. Russell test. Tritscler, C.J.Q.B., said:
206
There is now no need to consider whether conduct complained of caused
"danger to life, limb, or health, bodily or mentally, or a reasonable apprehension
of it" or any of the variations of that definition to be found in Russell.
In choosing the words "physical or mental cruelty of such a kind as to render
intolerable the continued cohabitation of the spouses" Parliament gave its own
fresh complete statutory definition of the conduct which is a ground for divorce
under s. 3 (d) of the Act.
As cruelty is a question of fact, the Court however stated that many of the
principles laid down in the former cases will continue to be proper guides.
This difference between the Delaney and Zalesky cases has been noticed
in subsequent decisions. In Paskiewich v. Paskiewich20 7 it was pointed out
that these two judgments could not be reconciled with one another. And the
Supreme Court of British Columbia expressly declined to follow the Delaney
case and adopted, as its own, the reasoning in Zalesky v. Zalesky. The Zalesky
case has been referred to with approval in New Brunswick 08 and in Nova
Scotia,209 and in Galbraith v. Galbraith210 has recently been approved by the
Manitoba Court of Appeal. In Galbraith v. Galbraith the wife, in earlier pro-
ceedings, had appealed, inter alia, against a decree of judicial separation which
had been granted to her husband on his cross-petition. The wife's appeal was
allowed on the ground that her conduct toward her husband did not constitute
"legal cruelty". Before the judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal was
205 (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 471 (Man. Q.B.).
206 Id., 472.
207 (1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 622 (B.C.S.C.).
208 Bustin v. Bustin (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 496. But see Chouinard v. Chouinard
(1969) 1 N.B.R. (2d) 582, where the Court rejected a petition because there was no
evidence that the conduct of the respondent affected the health of the petitioner. But
the Court stated that it was not following Russell v. Russell as it took a less restricted
view of the meaning of cruelty and cited Zalesky v. Zalesky. Also see Maund v.
Maund (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 547.
209 Herman v. Herman (1969), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 551 (N.S.S.C.), at p. 557 per
Dubinsky J.: "My brother Pottier, J., in the unreported case of Nichols v. Nichols
approval to the Zalesky case. Subsequently, my brother Hart, J., in the unreported case
of Williams v. Williams (1968) No. 1201 00049, also on the question of mental cruelty,
found himself in agreement with Pottier, J." See too, Bonin v. Bonin (1969), 5 D.L.R.
(3d) 533 (N.S.S.C.). Also see, Gold v. Gold (1969), (N.S.S.C.), (unreported), where
Cowan C.J.T.D. did not find it necessary to decide this point.
210 (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 543 (Man. C.A.).
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delivered the husband commenced an action, the present action, for divorce
on the ground of cruelty pursuant to sec. 3 (d). The wife pleaded res
judicata in answer to this allegation of cruelty. The issue before the Manitoba
Court of Appeal was whether in the earlier action for judicial separation
there had been a determination of the same question, right or fact as that
presently before the Court. The prior determination in the action for
judicial separation had been that the conduct of the wife did not constitute
cruelty in law, meaning by that term cruelty as defined in Russell v. Russell.
And counsel for the husband submitted, inter alia, that there was no distinc-
tion between "cruelty" as defined in sec. 3 (d) and the meaning of cruelty
as laid down in the Russell case. This view was rejected by the Court, which
pointed out that sec. 3 (d) contained no mention of physical or mental harm,
actual or apprehended; and that if Parliament had intended such harm to be
a necessary ingredient of cruelty it would have been easy to so provide. The
Court further stated that there was nothing in the Divorce Act, 1968 to indi-
cate that the term "cruelty" as used therein was to have the same meaning in
divorce proceedings as that which had been so long established in matri-
monial proceedings other than divorce. Referring to the judgment of the
Court in the Zalesky case, Smith C.IM. said:21'
With respect, I also agree with Tritschler, CJ.Q.B. The Divorce Act was
passed to give effect to a deep-seated and long-expanding public opinion that the
law relating to divorce was in an unsatisfactory state and that to bring it into
accord with the needs of the times the grounds upon which divorce might be obtained
should be liberalized. This being the case, it seems clear that when Parliament
adopted the definition of cruelty in s. 3 (d) of the Act it had no intention of preserv-
ing the common law requirement of physical or mental harm, but was thinking of
any conduct which might reasonably be considered to be cruelty and which had the
effect of rendering continued cohabitation intolerable. The key element in the
definition is the intolerability of continued cohabitation.
Accordingly, since the definition of cruelty and the evidence required to
establish it differed in this way from the Russell v. Russell test, the Court
held that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply.
Meaning of cruelty under the fresh approach.
While it is too early as yet to state with any certainty the precise meaning,
under this fresh approach, of cruelty as defined by sec. 3 (d), nevertheless
from the Galbraith and Zalesky cases it is possible to suggest certain general
propositions. In Galbraith v. Galbraith, Smith C.J.M. said:212
It is not difficult to imagine cases in which the new statutory definition of
cruelty would produce a different result than the definition derived from
Russell v. Russell, supra. I think, for example, of cases in which there has been nof
physical or mental harm inflicted, and none is apprehended by either party, yet the
ill-treatment of one by the other, or of each by the other, has been such as to cause
one or both to hate, loathe or despise the other so greatly that continued life together
has become intolerable. I think also of cases in which the husband, under the influ-
ence of liquor, has beaten up his wife severely on a number of occasions, but though
such conduct would constitute cruelty under Russell v. Russell, supra, life together
has not become intolerable in fact, because, through the mysterious workings of
nature, they are still in love with each other, and continue to live together....
211 Id. at p. 548.
212 Id. at pp. 547-548.
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From examples given earlier in this judgment it is clear that evidence that is
sufficient to establish cruelty under s. 3 (d) of the Divorce Act may fall short of
establishing cruelty at common law. It is also clear that evidence which is relevant
to proving that continued cohabitation has become intolerable may not be relevant
or admissible where the criterion is physical or mental harm, actual or apprehended.
In Zalesky v. Zalesky the Court found that the parties were incompatible
and that the marriage, for the present at least, had broken down. The parties
had separated and the Court stated that this was the kind of case which,
if separation continued for three years, would come within sec. 4 (1) (e),
enabling a divorce to be granted on the separation ground. The Court con-
tinued:213
If, on this sort of evidence, the Courts are willing to find "physical or mental
cruelty of such a kind as to render intolerable the continued cohabitation", spouses,
after separation, will seldom wait three years before seeking divorce. Separation is
usually preceded by marital unpleasantness and it will become only too easy for one
or other of separated spouses to build up past disagreements to "intolerable"
dimensions.
From these decisions, therefore, it appears:
(a) While proof of danger, or reasonably apprehended danger, to
physical or mental health is necessary to sustain an allegation of
cruelty under Russell v. Russell, it is not vital to the success of a
divorce suit under sec. 3 (d), provided that the evidence establishes
that the continued cohabitation of the spouses has become intoler-
able.
(b) Conversely, absent such evidence of intolerability, a divorce petition
under see. 3 (d) will fail, even if the "doctrine of danger" is
satisfied.
(c) Also, the conduct in issue must be more than the type of marital
unpleasantness that usually precedes separation.
While each case must, of course, fall to be determined upon its own particular
facts, the following has been held not to satisfy sec. 3 (d): where the evidence
was a vague mixture of trivia;214 where the respondent got drunk on hisanniversary, became mad because the petitioner-who the Court felt was the
author of much of the marital unhappiness-danced with somebody else and
then came home and, in the petitioner's absence, smashed some furniture,
thereby frightening the baby sitter; 15 where the situation resulted in un-
pleasantness and discontentment,216 where there was evidence of drunkenness,
simpliciter; i.e. an absence of further evidence of cruelty, such as harass-
ment.2 17 On the other hand, cruelty has been established where the petitioner
213 Zalesky v. Zalesky (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 471, 475 (Man. Q.B.). Also Bonin v.
Bonin (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 533 (N.S.S.C.); Bustin v. Bustin (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d)
496.
214 Zalesky v. Zalesky (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 471 (Man. Q.B.).
215 Bonin v. Bonin (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 533 (N.S.S.C.).
216 Bustin v. Bustin (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 496.
21? Knight v. Knight (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 438 (B.C.S.C.).
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alleged that the respondent drank to excess, used foul, vulgar language, ignored
her conversationally and sexually and abused her in front of other people.
218
Summary
It is clear that the preponderance of judicial opinion favours a fresh
approach to the interpretation of sec. 3 (d). It is, however, submitted that it
is possible to construe sec 3 (d) in accordance with the meaning of cruelty
generally prevailing in Canadian jurisdictions prior to the Act of 1968.
To say that the adoption of the Russell v. Russell test would provide a
uniform meaning to "cruelty" when used as a ground for divorce and when
used as a ground for relief in other contexts, for example an award of alimony,
may not be persuasive. For if this test is deemed unsatisfactory there is
surely no need to expand its operation to divorce law. Sec. 3, however, uses
expressions, without defining them, expressions which have meaning under the
prior law. For example, adultery in sec. 3 (a); and its congeners-true with
the exception of "homosexual act"-in sec. 3 (b). So too "form of marriage"
in sec. 3 (c) relates to conduct with a meaning already understood. Why then
should the word "cruelty" in sec. 3 (d), a word likewise with a "long
previous history which cannot be disregarded",219 be construed in any differ-
ent light? There seems no reason to suppose that Parliament's intention varied
in this way. Nor that the method of construction of sec. 3 should so depend
upon the particular paragraph in issue. In other words, by and large, it would
appear that see. 3 was intended to codify as grounds for divorce concepts
already known to the law, while new concepts, new philosophies, have found
their place in sec. 4. This is consistent with sec. 9 (1) (c) which relates only
to proceedings brought under see. 3 and which uses the words "condonation"
and "connivance", words which-subject to sec. 2 (d)-are not defined in
the Act but which will, presumably, be interpreted in accordance with their
meaning as heretofore established. But, of course, the word "cruelty" does not
stand alone.
In Delaney v. Delaney, the Court held that to satisfy sec. 3 (d) a petitioner
had to establish not only cruelty that met the test of Russell V. Russell, but
the further element of intolerability of cohabitation. It is not clear, however,
whether sec. 3 (d) does require proof of such an additional factor. The reason
is this. Under the Russell v. Russell test there must, of course, be injury or
apprehended injury to the health of the petitioner; and this has been said to
be the essence of the matter.220 But this is not all: the conduct alleged must,
in addition, go beyond the "reasonable wear and tear of married life".
221
218 Williams v. Williams (1969), (N.S.S.C.), (unreported). See also Maund v.
Maund (1969) 1 N.B.R. (2d) 547, where a decree was granted under sec. 3 (d). But see
Chouinard v. Chouinard (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 582.
219 Williams v. Williams [1964] A.C. 698, at p. 753 per Lord Pearce.
220 Hutton v. Hutton (1957), 40 M.P.R. 135 (N.S. Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes).
221 Buchler v. Buchler [1947] P. 25, p. 47 per Asquith LJ. Also, Gollins v.
Gollins [1964] A.C. 644, 659, 694; Gist v. Gist (1958), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 87 (Ont. C.A.).
[VOL. 7, No. 2
Symposium on Family Law
Decisions since the Gollins and Williams cases-and perhaps because of the
holding in the former case that an intention to injure is not an essential
requisite for cruelty-have reiterated the need for the second safeguard
referred to by Lord Pearce in the passage cited above; that is, that the matter
must be grave and weighty.
222
The test is still: Was the conduct of such a grave and weighty nature as to
make cohabitation virtually impossible?
This extract was referred to in Cuthbert v. Cuthbert,223 where, in an alimony
action, the question before the Ontario Court of Appeal was whether the
conduct there in issue constituted an act of cruelty such as to justify the wife
leaving her husband. In holding that it was not, and in noting in passing sec.
3 (d), the Court said that this conduct could not be considered "of such grave
and weighty nature as to make the continuation of the marriage intolerable".2
24
And in Saunders v. Saunders, Scarman J., referring to a passage from the
speech of Lord Pearce in the Gollins case, said:
22 5
The truth is, that Lord Pearce was recognizing that the "grave and weighty"
test of alleged matrimonial misconduct remains in full force and effect as one of the
great safeguards against matrimonial relief being given on mere trivialities or
incompatibility.
Is not this the same purpose as that sought to be fulfilled by the concluding
words of sec. 3 (d)? Do not these words likewise provide a safeguard against
matrimonial relief being given on mere trivialities or incompatibility?
In Gollins v. Gollins Lord Pearce said226 that "... when reprehensible
conduct or departure from the normal standards of conjugal kindness causes
injury to health or an apprehension of it, it is, I think, cruelty if a reasonable
person, after taking due account of the temperament and all the other particu-
lar circumstances would consider that the conduct complained of is such that
this spouse should not be called on to endure it." Is it not possible to construe
sec 3 (d) in this way? Can it not be suggested that the expression "of such a
kind as to render intolerable the continued cohabitation of the spouses" which
follows the word "cruelty" in sec. 3 (d) was merely meant to write into sec.
3 (d) the requirement of the prior law that the conduct alleged must be grave
and weighty? That this expression, in other words, has the same function (or
lack of function) as, in the view of the Court in Delaney v. Delaney, is served
by the words "physical or mental"; in both cases their purpose being merely
to make clear the intention of sec. 3 (d) to enact as a ground for divorce in
Canada, the concept of cruelty as that concept is understood in what has been
termed the Russell v. Russell sense. While such a result may not be considered
desirable, it does seem to follow as a matter of statutory construction. A short
amendment to sec. 3 (d) could place the matter beyond doubt.
222 Saunders v. Saunders [1965] P. 499, at p. 507 per Sir Jocelyn Simon P. Also,
Le Brocq v. Le Brocq [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1085; McEwan v. McEwan (1964), 108 Sol. Jo.
198; Arthur v. Arthur (1964), 108 Sol. Jo. 317; Sheldon v. Sheldon [1966] P. 62;
Mulhouse v. Mulhouse [1966] P. 39; White v. White (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 60 (N.S.
Ct. for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes); Ainsworth v. Ainsworth (1967), 10 F.L.R.
396 (N.S.W.S.C.).
223 (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 637 (Ont. C.A.).
224 Id., 643.
225 [1965] P. 499, 512.
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VI
CONCLUSION
The law of divorce in Canada is presently as prescribed in the Divorce
Act, 1968. There is no doubt that this statute represents a very real advance
in Canadian jurisprudence. In general terms, the Divorce Act, 1968 severed
Canadian law from dependence upon the Imperial Act of 1857, and this
is surely to be welcomed. A great advance has been made but it seems
reasonably clear that additional progress is necessary. Sec. 3 in some ways
represents a link with the past. It is the repository of the concept of matrimo-
nial offence, a concept used "to give some justification for breaking an indis-
soluble union against the will of the offending party".227 Such a justification
is today recognized by many as falacious. The present trend is towards the
substitution of the fact of marriage breakdown as the rationale requiring,
and justifying, divorce. Three discrete yet curiously interwoven interests
appear discernible in any enquiry as to divorce law: the societal interest, the
interest of the children of the marriage, if any, and the interest of the spouses.
Assume that there has been a permanent breakdown of marriage, that the
spouses are living separate and apart, and that this state of affairs has con-
tinued for one year. If adultery, or other cause present in sec. 3 is proved, a
divorce can be obtained forthwith on the basis of that marital offence. Absent
such proof, a petitioner who has not deserted his spouse must wait a further
two years for relief. Are the above interests furthered by this distinction? Or
would such interests be better served by granting a divorce and placing empha-
sis upon ensuring that proper arrangements are made for the custody and
maintenance of the children and for the maintenance of the petitioner or
respondent spouse?
The Divorce Act, 1968 shelters, side by side, in sees. 3 and 4, two quite
different and possibly incompatible divorce philosophies. If there is public
acceptance of the notion of marriage breakdown as a basis for divorce, it
is to be hoped that this concept will prevail as the exclusive determinative of
divorce and that matrimonial fault will thereby be swept away.
226 [1964] A.C. 644, 695.
227 Williams v. Williams [1964] A.C. 698, at p. 752 per Lord Pearce.
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